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Costa Rica’s 
Export Strategy: 
The Real Problem
If Costa Rica’s export profile is non- 
sustainable, it is no t for the reasons 
detailed by Mary A. Clark in “Costa 
Rica’s Export Strategy” (Hemisphere, 
Summer 1992).
First, the Certificado de Abono 
Tributario (CAT) is not part of the 
new governm ent’s export strategy. 
Rather, it is an old instrum ent that 
tried to neutralize the export-inhib- 
iting effects of the form er import- 
substitution regimen. CATs are 
incompatible with the General 
Agreem ent on Tariffs and Trade 
that Costa Rica has joined; al­
though beneficiaries obviously do 
no t want to see them  disappear, 
external pressure to eliminate 
them  will continue.
Second, the implication that ris­
ing imports accompanied by rising 
exports is bad does not conform to 
economic theory. Indeed, the main 
benefit of increased exports is that 
they allow increased imports of 
goods and services that can be 
obtained from foreign sources at 
better prices a n d /o r  quality. A 
m ore appropriate criticism of the 
maquila industry is that it does not 
foster the technical development 
of a country and that it is relatively 
footloose in the pursuit of low 
wages.
Third, if nontraditional agricul­
tural exports favor large foreign 
firms, the economic damage is not 
obvious. It is not self-evident that 
a farm er working his own land ex­
clusively is better off than a farmer 
who is employed by a large farm 
and works his own land part-time. 
Employers have to pay the workers
social benefits that may not accrue 
to someone who is working his own 
land full-time. Wages may also be 
better under em ployment than the 
implied wage in self-employment.
Fourth, there is no evidence 
that nontraditional agricultural ex­
ports are m ore intensive in pesti­
cide than are o ther crops. Indeed, 
increasing evidence is being pub­
lished on the detrim ental envi­
ronm ental impact of traditional 
banana production. Further, the 
climatic conditions required for a 
given crop are the same in Costa 
Rica as anywhere else; increased 
pesticide use is no t perforce more 
necessary in Costa Rica than else­
where. Environmental degradation 
is a problem  of agricultural produc­
tion in general, no t of nontradi­
tional export crops or Costa Rica 
in particular.
Finally, deforestation was oc­
curring in Costa Rica long before 
the emphasis on nontraditional ex­
ports. Indeed, currently logged 
areas are generally no t suited for 
export crops and are far away from 
the transportation links that are 
critical to exports.
Perhaps the weakest point of the 
current Costa Rican export pro­
gram is that it does no t foster the 
technical development of its peo­
ple. Alas, the author does no t m en­
tion it.
Ed Canler 
Chattanooga, Tennessee
Reply: Yes, and No
The following is my response to Ed 
Canler’s letter regarding my article 
on Costa Rica in Hemisphere (Sum­
m er 1992).
CATs
Mr. Canler is wrong to assert that 
the export-tax credit known as the 
Certificado de Abono Tributario 
(CAT) was not a critical elem ent of 
the nontraditional export push of 
the 1980s. The CAT was created in 
1972 as part of an effort to pro­
mote extraregional exports, but 
they grew very slowly. Central gov­
ernm ent expenditures on CATs 
boom ed after legislation was 
passed in 1984 incorporating them 
into a newly created package of 
benefits awarded to nontraditional 
exporters. As the main incentive of­
fered in these export contracts, the 
fiscal cost of CAT subsidies in­
creased rapidly to the levels I re­
port in the article.
In the late 1980s, the Arias ad­
ministration, as well as the World 
Bank, recognized the nonsustain­
ability of these subsidies and ini­
tiated negotiations with exporters 
to reduce them. These efforts car­
ried over into the Rafael Calderon 
government, which took office in 
May 1990. Only on December 1, 
1992, did the Consejo Nacional de 
Inversiones, acting on orders from 
President Calderon, make the po­
litically bold move o f eliminating 
future CAT contracts. But because 
the government will honor preexist­
ing agreements to pay CAT subsi­
dies, the system will constitute a 
considerable burden on the fiscal 
budget for some time.
Import Costs
Granted, a primary benefit of 
added exports is the ability to in­
crease imports and my article 
should not be understood to sug­
gest otherwise. Rather, in the dis­
cussion concerning the cost of
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im ported inputs associated with ex­
port production, I sought mainly to 
encourage debate about the merits 
of continuing tax-free entry of 
these com ponents and considera­
tion of stiffer local content require­
ments for exports, as the first 
implies forgone tax revenue and 
the second m ight foster greater na­
tional vertical integration in the 
new industries. I make clear in the 
article that I share Mr. Canler’s 
concern with the footloose nature 
of assembly industries.
Nontraditional Agricultural 
Exports and Small Farmers
Here Mr. Canler’s objection really 
only deals with the size of producer 
that might be most propitious for 
nontraditional agricultural export 
(NTAE) industries, no t with the na­
tionality of such firms. In the last 
paragraph of this letter, I will relate 
nationality to the problem  of tech­
nical development in agriculture. 
Mr. Canler also limits himself to de­
bate over the potential indirect ef­
fects of NTAE’s marginalization of 
small farming units. I will begin my 
discussion on this level and then re­
view the direct economic, social, 
and political impacts felt in Costa 
Rica as a result of the transition to 
a new set of agricultural policies 
begun in the 1980s.
It is conceivable that individual 
farmers m ight gain higher wages 
by abandoning their own land and 
working on a larger operation or 
finding nonagricultural employ­
ment. But it would appear equally 
probable that families’ welfare 
could decline as they lose access to 
land. There is evidence that larger 
NTAE operations absorb propor­
tionately less labor than smaller
units. In addition, employment on 
these large farms is often seasonal 
and working conditions can be 
poor, although we would expect 
labor legislation to be more effec­
tive in Costa Rica than in o ther 
Central American countries.
To date, we d o n ’t have the in­
formation required to show that 
either of these possibilities domi­
nates in reality and we may have to 
measure how the characteristics of 
each crop affect key variables such 
as labor intensity before drawing 
conclusions. Meanwhile, we should 
consider that the best option may 
be to help small agriculturalists 
grow NTAE crops on their own 
farms because the smaller produc­
tion units often absorb m ore labor. 
Moreover, these families could then 
hold on to their chief source of 
wealth and security, land.
We know quite a bit about what 
did happen to farmers during Costa 
Rica’s transition toward NTAE in 
the 1980s. Agricultural policy 
changes, driven more by govern­
m ents’ efforts at crisis containm ent 
than by a coherent development 
plan, created a situation in which 
many farmers, especially small 
ones, were forced to choose be­
tween growing unfamiliar crops or 
finding alternative forms of subsis­
tence. Reductions in support prices 
for basic grains and reformulation 
of the Sistema Bancario Nacional’s
agricultural credit toward export 
crops, particularly nontraditional 
ones, encouraged some farmers to 
grow tropical fruits, spices, and or­
nam ental plants without adequate 
risk assessment or insurance pro­
grams. Others were pushed off 
their land or out of agriculture 
altogether without any kind of as­
sistance in making the transition to 
alternative employment.
The ensuing economic catas­
trophe and social dislocation in the 
countryside provoked huge pro­
tests by Costa Rica’s farmers in the 
late 1980s. In turn, the Arias gov­
ernm ent found itself spending sub­
stantial time and money seeking a 
solution to the political disruption.
Pesticide Use and NTAE
Pesticides used in previous rounds 
of export prom otion in Costa Rica 
and other Central American coun­
tries, particularly in bananas and 
cotton, increased the resistance of 
some pests, poisoned humans, and 
harm ed the environment. Such 
chemicals are clearly employed 
m ore intensively in the newest agri­
cultural exports than in the produc­
tion of food crops such as corn and 
beans. Researchers have already 
docum ented problems related to 
pesticide use and NTAE crops in 
several regional nations, partic­
ularly in winter vegetables and
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Letters to the Editor
melons. Monocultural production 
patterns, overuse stemming from a 
variety of causes (including the cul­
tivation of temperate-zone crops in 
the tropics where they encounter 
new pest threats and the natural 
predators of the original climate 
may be absent), and poor govern­
m ent regulation of pesticides have 
led to a vicious circle of height­
ened pest resistance and stepped- 
up application in several countries.
For example, an explosion of 
pests virtually collapsed the winter 
vegetable industry and damaged 
melon exports in the Dominican 
Republic in the late 1980s. The 
same outcom e plagues the same 
crops in Guatemala and Honduras. 
During the last six years, the US 
Food and Drug Administration re­
jected  thousands of nontraditional 
produce shipments from the Do­
minican Republic, Guatemala, and 
Costa Rica for pesticide residue vio­
lations. Costa Rican authorities,
the US Agency for International 
Development, and multinational 
exporters view this issue as serious 
enough to warrant their effort in 
increased control over pesticide 
use and educational programs for 
growers.
A nother worrisome aspect of 
the problem, at least in the short 
term, is that severe NTAE crop 
losses due to pest outbreaks seem 
to affect growers differentially. We 
have evidence that large growers 
and foreign firms often adjust pro­
duction techniques or relocate, 
while smaller farmers, often al­
ready heavily indebted, are more 
likely to lose their land when faced 
with massive crop failure. Again, at 
least in this transitional stage, diffi­
culties associated with the relative 
risk assumed by different sizes of 
NTAE growers, as well as the health 
and environmental impacts of in­
creased pesticide use, need to be 
better addressed.
Deforestation
Deforestation in Costa Rica is 
largely a post-World War II phe­
nom enon resulting in great part 
from the previous round of NTAE 
expansion, especially in beef cattle. 
As ranchers cleared the land for 
pasture and displaced peasants 
burned down trees in their efforts 
to eke out a living in the country­
side, much of Costa Rica’s forests 
literally went up in smoke. Thus, 
logging has no t been the main 
cause of deforestation. Costa Rica’s 
remaining forests are highly en­
dangered as an increasing landless 
population seeks access to these 
areas in order to survive and those 
engaged in slash-and-burn agricul­
ture must move on every few years 
after exhausting fragile tropical 
soils. The current expansion in 
banana and NTAE cultivation 
only aggravates the problem 
although the new crops do not 
appear to be as land intensive as 
cattle ranching.
Nontraditional Exports and 
Technological Transfer
Finally, I couldn’t agree m ore with 
Mr. Canler that too little attention 
has been directed toward evalua­
tion of the potential contribution 
of Costa Rica’s current export drive 
to the nation’s technical develop­
ment. For this reason, I point out 
in my article that Costa Rica’s as­
sembly industries tend to offer low- 
skill jobs and remain disarticulated 
from the rest of the economy. One 
could also argue that the national­
ity of nontraditional agricultural ex­
port firms operating in Costa Rica 
is relevant to this issue. Because for­
eign firms are not obliged to meet 
any technological transfer require­
ments, it is unclear how m uch pro­
duction and m arketing expertise 
Costa Ricans will gain from their 
presence.
Mary A. Clark 
D epartm ent of Political Science 
University of Wisconsin at Madison
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Conservation and Indigenismo
by Daniela Peluso
W hen visiting native federations in Ama­zonia today, it is no longer uncom m on to find some of their members attending 
conferences in Europe or the US.
In recent years, many indigenous 
Amazonian leaders have gained 
considerable international recogni­
tion working with foreign environ­
mentalists, largely due to growing 
acknowledgement of the potential 
role of indigenous peoples in the 
conservation of tropical forests.
The international conservation 
movement has indeed played a 
valuable role in prom oting the de­
velopm ent of native Amazonian 
federations. Nevertheless, basic 
political and pragmatic problems 
arise from the interplay of conser­
vationist discourse with the con­
struction of ethnic identity by 
indigenous peoples.
Environmentalists, development 
workers, and anthropologists com­
monly associate the concept of “na­
tive people” with the stereotype of 
the “ecologically noble savage” who 
lives in perfect harmony with na­
ture. Although Amazonian cultures 
do possess elaborate systems of eco­
logical knowledge, these do not 
automatically translate into West­
ern  notions of conservation with 
sustainability at the top of their 
agenda. Still, this stereotype has 
inform ed the policies of foreign 
environm ental agencies and con-
Daniela Peluso is a Ph.D. candidate 
in the Department of Anthropology at 
Columbia University. Since 1987 she 
has been working directly with native 
communities in Amazonia on issues of 
conservation.
sequently become an im portant 
influence in the construction of 
ethnic identity by indigenous peo­
ples. If environmentalists grasped 
the ironies between the cultural 
values attributed to indigenous 
peoples and the way those people 
actually live, then environmental 
projects would stand a better 
chance of succeeding after the 
development professionals have 
left the local sites.
Environmentalists 
commonly associate 
tike concept cf “native 
I people” with the 
I stereotype of the 
“ecologically noble 
savage ” who lives in 
perfect harmony with 
nature.
The Power of Imitation
Imitation is an im portant process 
in the interactions between Euro- 
American, Latin American, mes­
tizo, and indigenous cultures. For 
example, indigenous groups enter­
ing the regional m arket economy 
typically imitate the tastes and prac­
tices of the dom inant local mestizo 
culture in order to gain social ac­
ceptance. Likewise, the mestizos 
typically adopt the tastes and prac­
tices of the “whites,” who control 
the supralocal flow of credit, goods,
services, and profits that shapes 
mestizo opportunities in the local 
area. Thus mestizo settlers in the 
Amazon have adopted single-crop 
agriculture over that of crop diversi­
fication—in spite of higher costs 
and reduced nutrition—because 
they have been encouraged to do 
so through the social incentives of 
national economic and political 
policies. The mestizo example, 
then, leads native communities to 
adopt m onocropping as well.
The process of culture change 
for Amazonian peoples has been 
largely one of imitating mestizo cul­
ture, but a new elem ent has been 
introduced as foreigners become 
increasingly active in native com­
munities. Indigenous people now 
often imitate what the conservation­
ists want to see in them: an idealized 
image of the Indian past. In this re­
gard, the native peoples may not 
actually practice past customs, but 
may merely appear as if they were 
doing so. The focus, then, is on the 
image of their cultural past as the 
likeness of the ecologically noble 
savage.
Why is this projection of the past 
so powerful? Perhaps the reason 
lies within the conservation agenda, 
which has provided an alternative 
discourse for native people in their 
subordinate national positions. 
Since the mid-1980s foreign envi­
ronm ental organizations have tar­
geted native peoples and their 
federations as beneficiaries of 
funds for programs of sustainable 
development. The funds tend to be 
channeled to those native peoples 
who employ sustainable practices 
that the environmentalists regard 
as involving community-based con­
servation with potential market 
value. W hen such native people do 
not exist, the environmentalists in­
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vent them —or the native people in­
vent themselves as “traditionalists.” 
The following scenario is an ex­
ample of how the desire to pro­
m ote sustainable development 
influences the response of native 
people to simulate their cultural 
past. In many areas of Amazonia, 
indigenous communities have over­
collected turtle eggs despite bodies 
of traditional knowledge that warn 
against this ecologically unsound 
behavior. When the representatives 
of a turtle conservation project 
approach a native community look­
ing for local models of preserva­
tion, community leaders may 
respond by reciting the teachings 
of their elders a n d /o r  by claiming 
to still employ nonexploitative prac­
tices of both egg collection and 
hunting—which, in some cases, 
have actually not been practiced 
for generations. The local leaders 
thereby satisfy the outsiders’ search 
for “pristine,” “traditional” knowl­
edge and enhance their own access 
to First World resources. The proc­
ess of embracing their “Indianness” 
is also a means of bolstering the po­
litical leverage of native leaders in 
relation to the mestizo population, 
which dominates the local Ama­
zonian economies.
Not all members of a given in­
digenous community are equally 
interested in, or adept at, the po­
litical strategy of miming their 
g roup’s cultural past. The most in­
clined to this strategy are those per­
sons whose activities and identities 
are least bound up with their 
g roup’s ethnic heritage. As articu­
lation with the state ensues, native 
communities perceive leadership 
positions as best suited for those 
members who know how to speak 
the language of mestizos, are most 
like them, and know how to deal
with them. Those members of na­
tive communities who have these 
characteristics are the very ones 
that conservationists tend to adopt 
as local project leaders.
These political and 
cultural dynamics 
strengthen the hand 
of those segments 
of indigenous 
populations that 
are least attached 
to practices 
of sustainable 
development.
The resulting community dy­
namics contain a basic irony. On 
the one hand, the most locally ori­
ented of the native people tend to 
seek equal footing with mestizos by 
adopting the tastes and customs 
of mestizo culture. On the o ther 
hand, the least locally oriented of 
the natives tend to seek equal foot­
ing with the mestizos by miming 
the tastes and customs of Indian 
culture. The foreign environm en­
talists who prom ote what they as­
sume are pristine indigenous 
practices are rarely aware of these 
dynamics and their own key role as 
outsiders in setting them  in motion.
In sum, as environmental con­
servation becomes a vital objective
of developm ent professionals, 
Amazonia’s native peoples are 
coming to regard their past as a re­
source for altering their current 
identity and enhancing their future 
prospects. Though they may cur­
rently be subordinated to the local 
mestizos, Amazonia’s native people 
are discovering that Indian prac­
tices and identity can give them  
access to strategic political and eco­
nomic resources from the outside 
world.
Policy Consequences 
and Options
How does this option jeopardize 
the success of conservation projects 
in Amazonia? Basically it does so by 
strengthening the hand of those 
segments of indigenous popula­
tions that are least attached to 
practices of sustainable tropical 
managem ent, such as diversified 
agriculture and reforestation. In 
fact, these groups are the most 
likely to engage in what, from an 
environmental standpoint, are un­
desirable practices, such as mono­
cropping, cattle ranching, and pig 
ownership. Given the local and ex­
tralocal web of discourse and 
power, the native people who do 
practice sustainable m anagem ent 
are the least likely to possess the 
knowledge o f Western language 
and culture that is necessary to ob­
tain resources from environmental 
organizations.
Many anthropologists involved 
with Amazonia’s native federations 
are aware of the contradiction be­
tween the ethnic image and the 
ethnic way of life of local leaders. 
Nonetheless, in light of the exist­
ing local inequalities of wealth and 
power—which underlie the limited 
capacity of true practitioners of
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sustainable m anagem ent to gain 
recognition and resources from in­
ternational environmentalists— 
such anthropologists tend to over­
look viable alternatives. W hat must 
environmentalists do to mitigate 
or eliminate the problem?
First, they must recognize that 
native federations are not “indige­
nous” entities; rather, the federa­
tions are m odeled after Western 
hierarchical structures and do not 
represent all native people on 
equal terms. In many cases it would 
be appropriate for environmental­
ists to com bine work through na­
tive federations with direct support 
to communities, clusters of house­
holds, or individual families. For 
example, a project on turtle conser­
vation could work with a commu­
nity elder who, though illiterate 
and unprepared for the tasks of 
bureaucratic administration, could 
give workshops on m ethods of tur­
tle preservation.
Second, environmentalists must 
expand their definition of “indige­
nous.” For instance, the Ribarerios, 
who live on the Amazonian flood 
plains o f Peru because of displace­
m ent during the rubber boom  of 
the nineteenth  century, are not 
considered “p u re” native people, 
even though their culture has dis­
tinctly local features that include 
sophisticated m ethods of sustain­
able tropical agriculture. As native 
groups interm arry am ong each 
o ther and with mestizos and as the 
native mimes the mestizo who is 
miming the native, local ethnic 
boundaries become increasingly 
blurred. Do we incarcerate the 
term “indigenous” by book-ending 
it with the polarized and flawed cri­
teria of genetics on the one ex­
trem e and politically based miming 
of the ethnic cultural past on the 
other?
The boundaries o f “indigenous” 
culture change as cultural bounda­
ries change in general. Recognition 
of the fluidity of such boundaries is 
vital in our quest to formulate and 
im plem ent effective, culturally ap­
propriate models of environmental 
conservation. ■
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Whither the Caribbean? Whither Florida?
by Mark B. Rosenberg
n Hemisphere s very first com­
mentary in the fall of 1988, edi­
tor Anthony P. Maingot called 
attention to critical issues fac­
ing the Caribbean. He then 
warned that . . this region of 
sovereign but balkanized and frag­
ile states might be reaching the lim­
its of its privileged bargaining with 
the US and the EEC . . . the Carib­
bean states will have to compete 
economically like everyone else, or 
at least create new noneconom ic ra­
tionales for additional attention.” 
The collapse of the socialist 
system, the demise of the Soviet 
Union, the disappearance of the 
Third World as a political reality, 
and rapid advances in information 
technology and economic globaliza­
tion signal that the post-Cold War 
realignm ent of the world has be­
gun. Now that a new twenty-first 
century agenda is imminent, how­
ever, the Caribbean runs an acute 
risk of irrelevance due to its diffi­
culty in adapting to this rapidly 
changing international environ­
ment.
Threats on All Sides
A glance at Caribbean Basin eco­
nomic output is all that is required 
to realize the precarious position 
the region holds in the global 
arena. The sum of the basin’s gross 
domestic product is but 20% o f the 
state o f Florida’s output. This fig­
ure reveals the region’s principal 
challenge: to construct a rationale 
for continued economic involve­
m ent in the area by the industrial­
ized world.
Mark B. Rosenberg is an associate 
editor o/'Hemisphere.
Past interest and involvement 
in the Caribbean Basin by indus­
trialized countries has been based 
on colonial ties and security con­
cerns, neither of which is com­
pelling in a post-Cold War era. 
Even though the end of the Cold 
War has brought with it a decline 
in conflict between the Great Pow­
ers, the struggle am ong nations 
and regions for improved eco­
nomic well-being has only inten­
sified.
Now that a new 
twenty-first century 
agenda is imminent, 
the Caribbean runs 
an acute risk of 
irrelevance in a 
rapidly changing 
world.
—— — — -— -—  ____ ___ I
For the Caribbean, this new 
world framework has created five 
basic problems, the most imme­
diate of which is the Clinton 
administration. Even before the 
Democratic Party captured the US 
presidency in the 1992 election, 
the Caribbean came under blister­
ing and unprecedented attacks 
from both A1 Gore and Bill Clinton. 
Listen to Gore on the popular tele­
vision news program  “N ightiine” 
before a national audience: “I voted 
against the Caribbean Basin Initia­
tive when it was created. I thought 
it was a mistake then, I think it’s
a mistake now . . . you have the 
Bush administration opposing ac­
tivist policies to create jobs here at 
home, but supporting an industrial 
policy for o ther countries to steal 
jobs from the United States and 
take them  overseas” (September 
30, 1992).
Days later, Clinton echoed 
G ore’s attacks, when he declared 
on Phil D onahue’s television talk 
show that . . Reagan did that 
[established the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative] to prop up right-wing 
governments that he agreed with 
politically. . . . They used our tax 
dollars to drive wages down in 
America and to drive wages down 
in Central America . . . ” (October 
6, 1992).
What better indication for the 
Caribbean that a new era had ar­
rived? In a presidential campaign 
that was remarkably devoid of de­
bate about international issues and 
foreign policy, one of the few inter­
national topics to emerge in the dis­
course was the Caribbean, and it 
did so negatively. Coupled with the 
prevailing anti-Caribbean feelings 
am ong many Washington bureau­
crats, this anti-Caribbean sentim ent 
has created a crew of hardened 
hearts in the key trade-related agen­
cies of the US governm ent such as 
the Latin America offices of the US 
Trade Representative, the Depart­
m ent of Commerce, and the De­
partm ent of State.
These currents of anti-Carib- 
bean sentim ent in the US govern­
m ent parallel and are reinforced 
by a new US approach to trade pol­
icy, which had already begun to sur­
face in the latter days of the Bush 
presidency. Casting aside the Cold 
War-oriented “preferential access” 
approaches to international trade, 
the Clinton administration is
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clearly favoring trade arrange­
ments based on “comparable ac­
cess” or “reciprocity.” Thus, few 
interests in Washington these days 
are disposed to prom ote or main­
tain trade agreements that are 
one-way in nature. CBI-style ar­
rangem ents are relics of the past; 
a new era of hard-ball trade politics 
has begun.
Evidence of these threats is the 
prospect of a North American Free 
Trade Agreem ent (NAFTA). As US 
tariffs on Mexican products, such 
as textiles, are eliminated, NAFTA 
is expected to divert the flow of 
both trade and investment away 
from the Caribbean to Mexico, 
thereby diminishing the value of 
Caribbean-privileged access to the 
US m arket through the Caribbean 
Basin Initiative (CBI). The pros­
pect of NAFTA at first demoralized 
Caribbean leadership. Now there is 
a certain resignation to its inevita­
bility.
A nother potential threat to the 
Caribbean is a capitalist Cuba. 
W hen the island nation shifts to a 
m arket economy, it will first seek to 
export sugar to the US and then 
seek foreign investment to develop 
an assembly-manufacturing capac­
ity. Both of these sectors in Cuba 
are already competitive by any 
standard. Which Caribbean Basin 
countries will be asked to give up a 
portion of their diminishing sugar 
quota? Which assembly plants will 
relocate from one Caribbean 
export platform to another? O f 
course, Cuba will also appeal great­
ly to US tourists seeking new and 
more exotic Caribbean beaches. 
Hence, the re-entry of Cuba into 
the capitalist world market—hardly 
a decimal point in global economic 
statistics—will have profound impli­
cations for Caribbean m arket rela­
tions and competitiveness.
Beyond the hem isphere, the his­
torical trading patterns between 
Europe and the Caribbean—pre­
served for the past 20 years by the 
Lome Conventions and the non­
reciprocal guaranteed access to 
European markets they provided— 
are threatened by the consolida­
tion of the Single European Market 
(SEM). A primary objective of the 
SEM is to institute a unified tariff 
structure for European imports, 
which will confront the bilateral 
trading arrangem ents on which the 
Lome Conventions and their proto­
cols have been based.
NAFTA would 
threaten both the 
principal export 
markets of the 
Caribbean and 
Florida’s role as the 
hub of North-South 
trade.
C urrent negotiations of the Uru­
guay Round of the General Agree­
m ent on Tariffs and Trade include 
a much debated proposal to phase 
out the quota system—the Multi- 
Fibre A rrangem ent (MFA)—that 
has managed to restrain Asian tex­
tile and apparel producers from 
furthering their dom inance of the 
world market. Elimination of the 
MFA over the 10-year period under 
consideration would expose an in­
creasingly vital economic sector of 
the Caribbean region to intensified 
global competition.
The Caribbean, NAFTA, and the 
Florida Connection
The immediate dilemma, however, 
revolves around the likely impact 
of NAFTA on the Caribbean as 
well as the possibility of crafting a 
response that can be supported in 
both Washington and the Carib­
bean. Erosion of preferential 
access to the US m arket and di­
version of investment are the prin­
cipal short-term NAFTA challenges 
to the Caribbean Basin. The bene­
fits gained through the CBI would 
no t be reduced per se, but the com­
petitive position of CBI countries 
would deteriorate because of Mex­
ico’s increased access to the US 
market.
The size of Mexico’s market, its 
proximity to the US, and its lower 
production costs and abundant 
natural resources constitute an 
inheren t competitive advantage 
oyer the Caribbean Basin coun­
tries. These advantages, coupled 
with the elimination of tariffs and 
quotas on Mexican products enter­
ing the US market, create the po­
tential for a general reorientation 
of trade away from the Caribbean 
towards Mexico. This shift would 
threaten both the principal export 
markets of the Caribbean and Flor­
ida’s role as the hub of North- 
South trade in the hemisphere.
In response to this new set of 
challenges, Congressman Sam Gib­
bons (D-FL) has proposed legisla­
tion (HR 1403) to assure NAFTA 
parity for CBI countries. The pur­
pose of the bill is to ensure that the 
CBI is not adversely affected by the 
im plem entation of NAFTA and to 
apply fast-track approval to free 
trade agreements between the US 
and certain Caribbean Basin coun­
tries.
This legislation is im portant for 
Florida because it will help to pro­
tect jobs in both the Caribbean 
and Florida. An estimated 80,000 
jobs in the state are directly linked 
to CBI-related trade. Given that 
CBI countries account for m ore 
than 30% of Florida exports and 
20% of Florida imports, and given 
that Florida’s economic welfare in 
general is intimately tied to Carib­
bean prosperity, passage of this bill 
could be as im portant to Florida as 
it is to the Caribbean.
Although the destinies of Flor­
ida and the Caribbean are tightly 
intertwined through trade and 
commerce, there have been few 
systematic efforts by either side to 
embrace the o ther as a strategy for 
enhancing their common interna­
tional competitiveness and eco­
nomic well-being. This embrace
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must occur if Florida and the Carib­
bean are to benefit from the shift­
ing international forces that are 
driving economies and peoples to­
gether throughout the globe.
At a minimum, a strategic con­
sensus between Florida and the 
Caribbean should identify and pro­
mote common linkages and inter­
ests. While such a consensus must 
be grounded in self-interest, its 
premise would be the notion that 
interdependence and transna­
tional politics are now realities of 
the global landscape.
To move from rhetoric to ac­
tion, recognition of the num erous 
obstacles to the development of a 
broader strategic consensus and ac­
tion plan for Florida and the Carib­
bean is necessary. W hat are these 
obstacles?
The First Obstacle
To begin with, Florida possesses 
only a nascent capacity to articulate 
and im plem ent a strategic vision of 
the state’s stake in the world econ­
omy and the specific regional ar­
rangem ents that can prom ote 
Florida’s competitive advantages. 
There has been little serious atten­
tion to the international linkages 
that could improve Florida’s global 
competitiveness, in large part a re­
flection of the grip that traditional 
protectionist interests hold on the 
m achinery of the state’s govern­
ment. The problem  also reflects 
the limited understanding that Flor­
ida’s private-sector leaders have of 
the world’s dramatic economic 
transformations, and the fact that 
the Caribbean constituency in Flor­
ida is diffuse and weak.
The absence of a strong Carib­
bean constituency in Florida is strik­
ing in view of the state’s position as 
the Caribbean’s leading US export 
partner (about $4 billion in 1990).
In the coming years, Texas (in sec­
ond place at $1.2 billion) will be 
totally focused on trade with Mex­
ico. Despite its rhetoric, Louisiana 
(in third place at $1 billion) is es­
sentially a protectionist state and is 
directly competitive with the Carib­
bean in the production of strategic 
commodities such as sugar. O ther 
states, such as Georgia, now export 
as m uch to Mexico as they do to 
the entire basin. In short, there are 
few jurisdictions in the US with 
deep trade connections to the 
Caribbean.
The Second Obstacle
Another Florida-Caribbean prob­
lem is that the Caribbean has been 
tardy in grasping the regional impli­
cations of the end of the Cold War. 
Now that the spur of national secu­
rity no longer motivates US policy 
in the region, the Caribbean faces 
the indifferent attitude that has 
periodically characterized US for­
eign policy toward Latin America.
In this setting, however, the Carib­
bean region and Central America 
have yet to orchestrate an effective, 
common agenda in Washington. 
This problem  is no t new, but under 
current conditions any Caribbean
Basin agenda in Washington will 
be particularly difficult to sustain.
Caribbean Basin efforts have 
been oriented to the world’s trade 
capitals—Washington, Geneva, 
London, even San Juan. Although 
Florida essentially serves as the 
trade capital of the Caribbean, Car­
ibbean leaders have done little to 
integrate Florida into the alliances 
necessary to advance their com­
m on interests in the global market.
In the task of reorienting the 
Caribbean’s vision and alliances, 
there is little time to waste. The Cu­
ban time bom b is ticking, and the 
Caribbean and Florida must act to­
gether, not only to minimize the 
negative impact of US-Mexican 
free trade on the Caribbean Basin, 
but also to prepare to compete in a 
world of open markets. Mexico is 
first in the free trade line but will 
certainly not be the last. Both the 
Caribbean and Florida must recog­
nize and adapt to this changing 
environment. ■
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Russia and Latin America
by Vladimir P. Sudarev
C
an Russia replace the 
USSR in Latin America? 
Although the answer is 
apparently negative, the 
m atter is far from simple. 
With respect no t only to 
Cuba but to Latin America in gen­
eral, Russia is the USSR’s foreign- 
policy successor. The building of 
Russian-Latin American relations 
requires a new design, though 
some of the old Soviet structures 
remain useful.
Latin America’s im portance to 
the USSR was largely based on the 
quest for strategic balance with the 
US and in the Cold War setting of 
political and ideological rivalry. 
Cuba and Nicaragua were the aces 
in this game, in which the Soviet 
leadership tried to avoid open con­
frontation and its concomitant 
risks. The principal long-term ob­
jectives of Soviet strategy were the 
creation of low-intensity security 
problems for the US in its own 
backyard, the creation of a show­
case for “real” socialism in Cuba, 
and the support of leftist move­
ments throughout Latin America.
Latin America itself, however, 
was of little interest to the USSR. 
After all, how much did the super­
power of the East have in common 
with fragile democracies situated in 
the backyard of the superpower of 
the West? The margins for Soviet- 
Latin American cooperation were 
very narrow indeed, a fact of which 
the Soviets were well aware.
Vladimir P. Sudarev is director of the 
Department of International Relations 
at the Institute of Latin American 
Studies in Moscow. His recent publi­
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ship (Moscow, 1992).
Still, from the 1960s to the 
1980s the USSR created a diversi­
fied structure of presence in Latin 
America, which included diplo­
matic and economic missions, as 
well as programs of technical as­
sistance and cultural exchange.
Among other things, the USSR 
managed to penetrate Latin Amer­
ica’s regional weapons market, be­
coming, for instance, the key 
supplier of aircraft and tanks to 
Peru. Though Soviet-Latin Ameri­
can trade rarely exceeded $500 mil­
lion and usually carried a negative 
balance for the Soviets, it did, at 
times, assume strategic importance. 
So it was in the early 1980s, when 
Jimmy Carter imposed an embargo 
on the sale of US cereals to the So­
viet Union. Argentina became the 
USSR’s major cereals supplier and 
the value of Soviet-Latin American 
trade escalated.
Now that 
the East-West 
confrontation has 
ended, Russia—in 
many respects, quite 
a different state from 
that of the former 
Soviet Union—is 
searching to redefine 
its international role.
The Next Step?
Now that the East-West confronta­
tion has ended, Russia—in many re­
spects, quite a different state from 
that of the form er Soviet Union—is 
searching to define its role in the 
emerging post-Cold War order. 
Russian leadership is clearly inter­
ested in establishing partnerships 
with the Western democracies.
This interest is part of the obses­
sion, as often declared by foreign 
minister Andrei Kozirev, that Rus­
sia must become a “norm al great 
power”—fully integrated with the 
industrialized N orth of the new 
global order. Such integration is 
hardly possible, at least for the fore­
seeable future.
Why is it unlikely that Russia will 
become a m em ber of the northern  
industrial club? To begin with, Rus­
sian foreign policy must not only 
adapt itself to the country’s histori­
cal, territorial, and demographic 
dimensions and its Euro-Asian 
geostrategic position. In addition, 
its foreign policy must acknow­
ledge the country’s current phase 
of socioeconomic transition and 
crisis.
It would be illusory to suppose 
that the only solution to Russia’s 
socioeconomic transition and crisis 
would be to integrate with the 
West, even if this means taking the 
role of a weak partner. Such inte­
gration is today hardly realistic, 
given the fundam ental differences 
between Russian and western stages 
of industrial development, a dis­
advantage not taken into account 
by form er prime minister Egor 
Gaidar’s attem pt to jum p-start a 
Russian open-market economy. In 
a headlong dive into the economic 
seas of the West, Russia could well 
sink to the depths of long-term
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subordination, relegating itself to 
the semiperiphery of the post-Cold 
War order. In light of this vulner­
ability, a more desirable option for 
Russian policy today would be to 
map out an open, muldfaceted 
course of action that leaves behind 
the form er Soviet obsession with es­
tablishing a worldwide superpower 
presence. Russia’s relations with 
the West would become more open 
and multifaceted if they were to em­
brace no t only the western indus­
trial powers but the reinvigorated 
economies and fledgling dem ocra­
cies of Latin America as well.
Against this backdrop, Russia 
and much of Latin America sur­
prisingly converge on a num ber of 
issues. At the core of these is the in­
term ediate position of both Russia 
and a substantial portion of Latin 
America in the new world hierar­
chy. Thus, as Russia becomes the 
“South” of the North, the majority 
of Latin American countries are 
striving to become the “N orth” of 
the South. Russia is just now enter­
ing the path toward a democratic 
polity and a market economy, upon 
which Latin American countries 
such as Mexico, Chile, Argentina, 
and Brazil have already traveled a 
considerable distance.
What, then, can Russia learn 
from Latin America’s “state capital­
ism,” a stage that Russian reformists 
tried to leap over in 1992? What 
can Russia learn from Latin Amer­
ica about the social costs of neo­
liberal reforms, strategies for 
managing the foreign debt prob­
lem, and the pitfalls of democratiza­
tion? Latin America’s track record 
in these and other spheres is more 
germ ane to the formulation of Rus­
sian policy than are the past and 
present track records of Western 
Europe or the Asian dragons.
In short, Russia and m uch of 
Latin America face the same basic 
challenges in the emerging new 
global order. Among these are the 
threats of marginalization, in the 
world economy, technological de­
pendence, and foreign debt. In 
many respects, Russia and Latin 
America are becoming “natural 
partners.”
Russia and much 
of Latin America face 
the same basic global 
challenges, such as the 
threats of economic 
marginalization, 
technological 
dependence, and 
foreign debt
For example, with the possible 
exception of Chile, the Latin Amer­
ican countries of the Southern 
Cone and the Andes could well 
remain outside of the emerging 
North American megabloc for the 
foreseeable future. Although Mer­
cosur was formally included in the 
Bush adm inistration’s Enterprise 
for the Americas Initiative, it ap­
pears that for the time being this 
bloc has virtually no chance of 
grafting itself onto the North 
American Free Trade Agreement,
which in the coming decade will 
revolve around the absorption of 
Mexico. This scenario parallels 
that of Europe, where, in spite of 
a Russian vision of a new political 
and economic space “from the 
Atlantic to the Urals,” it is unlikely 
that even Eastern Europe will be­
come integrated with the Euro­
pean Community (EC) during the 
1990s.
A nother parallel exists in the 
realm of technology. For instance, 
in view of the growing importance 
of advanced technologies o f com­
munication, Argentina and Brazil 
could consume a wide array of 
Russian products and expertise, 
which the Argentines and Brazil­
ians could obtain on m ore favor­
able terms from Russia than from 
the West. Likewise, Russia badly 
needs access to the interm ediate 
technologies involved in light in­
dustry, which it can potentially 
acquire from Latin America on 
m ore favorable terms than from 
the West. At both levels, moreover, 
there are possibilities not only for 
“technological barter,” but also for 
jo in t ventures in assimilating and 
producing new technologies.
Does this equation leave out 
Mexico? Not at all, since Russia’s 
long-term policy planning must 
somehow incorporate the em er­
gence of the huge new economic 
space that encompasses the Ameri­
can and Asian sides of the Pacific 
Rim, within which Mexico is poised 
to assume a greatly enlarged role. 
Hence, conditions may be favor­
able for the establishment o f a 
“Pacific bridge” between Russia 
and Mexico, which previously had 
insignificant economic ties with the 
Soviet Union. The Russian region 
of the Far East, which remains 
practically unexplored by Latin
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American business interests, could 
emerge as a significant m arket for 
Latin America’s traditional and 
nontraditional exports, especially 
from Mexico.
Problems and Solutions
To be sure, even with recognition 
of such potential bilateral gains, 
Russian-Latin American trade faces 
obstacles such as comparatively 
high transportation costs and diffi­
cult financing. More im portant, 
however, is that Russia’s new leader­
ship has assumed the Soviet leader­
ship’s marginal interest in Latin 
America. Indeed, only through his 
participation in the June 1992 UN 
Environmental Summit in Brazil 
and side trips to Venezuela and Ar­
gentina did Russian vice president 
Alexander Rutskoi discover where 
Latin America is heading and its 
relevance to Russian options. And 
Russia’s trade delegations and eco­
nomic missions, inherited as they 
are from the Soviet bureaucracy, 
continue to reflect the inefficien­
cies of a state-controlled economy 
whose trade with Latin America, 
outside of Cuba, was minuscule.
But times change. Many Latin 
American countries are opening 
their markets and pursuing aggres­
sive export policies. To some ex­
tent the same is taking place in 
Russia. Nonetheless, Russia and 
Latin America continue to know 
little about each o th er’s economies 
and the trade opportunities they 
contain. A starting point would be 
the establishment of small, bilat­
eral initiatives that lay the founda­
tion for Russian-Latin American 
business links.
O ne possible bridge for Russian 
trade with Latin America is the US, 
by way of Florida, with its highly 
developed network of Latin Ameri­
can contacts. The utilization of this 
potential bridge is contingent on
the solution of the “Cuban prob­
lem .” As a successor to the USSR, 
Russia is deeply enm eshed in 
Cuba. Incoherent, even clumsy, 
attempts to adjust Russia’s relations 
with Fidel Castro in 1991-92 did 
nothing positive for Russian diplo­
macy and led to Russian economic 
losses.
Nevertheless, the Russian-Cuban 
trade agreem ent of November
1992 reflects a movement toward 
m ore balanced long-term relations. 
Given its new relations with the US 
and the EC, as well as its continu­
ing economic, technical, and cul­
tural links with Cuba, Russia may 
become a major player in the proc­
ess of redefining Cuba’s relations 
with the world in general. The 
beneficiaries would include not 
only Cuba and the US, but also 
Russia through the expansion 
and deepening of its participation 
in the post-Cold War world econ­
omy. ■
A MAJOR CHARITABLE GIFT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RIGHT PHILANTHROPIST
The MEDICAL, EYE & DENTAL INTERNATIONAL CARE ORGANIZATION, Inc., an independent 501 (c)3 
organization based in Austin, Texas, has sent 274 volunteers from throughout the United States to 
remote areas of Central America providing free health, dental and vision care to nearly 20,000 
poverty stricken children, men and women. Since being chartered in August of 1990, members of 
twenty M E D I C.O. teams have spent one week of their time, sharing their concern and talents at 
their own expense. M.E.D.I.C.O. has been recognized by Honduran government and medical 
authorities as a significant contributor in their nation's health care program. M.E.D.I.C.O. has seven 
teams scheduled for 1993, including two special surgical teams.
To date, M.E.D.I.C.O. has been administered by volunteers. The growth and success of the 
program now requires the services of a full-time administrator and an endowment to  financially 
support this position.
The founders and volunteers of M.E.D.I.C.O. invite contributions from major potential donors to help 
underwrite the operational costs of this much needed and expanding program. With a proven 
track record, the opportunity to be an integral part of a heartwarming successful humanitarian 
foundation is very real.
For More Information, Contact:
^  A  Norm Peters, Chairman, Board of Directors
F  n  P  L J  M.E.D.I.C.O.,Inc.
■ w  ■ 11Q7 Majn street, Georgetown, Texas 78626
Telephone (512) 863-8217 or fax (512) 863-8666.
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vSS New from University Press of Florida
The Pearl Necklace 
Toward A n  Archaeology of 
Brazilian T ransition  Discourse 
Roberto Reis
1991 Alfred Hower Prize 
“His conclusions are brilliant. Reis consid­
ers most of the text discussed herein to 
constitute an enormous self-portrait of the 
ruling classes produced by writers who in 
their great majority have come from these 
classes and have refused or been unable to go 
beyond them .” — Bobby J. Chamberlain, 
University of Pittsburgh 
C lo th  $22.95
Am azon Conservation 
in the Age of Development 
T he Limits of Providence 
Ronald A. Foresta
Fores ta’s detailed study of Brazilian Amazonia 
places international biological conservation 
in the context of late 20th century ideology, 
economics, and political practice and offers 
an informative guide to the pitfalls of con­
servation policy making in the T hird World. 
“Successfully blends excellent scholarship 
w ith field-based reporting. I strongly recom­
mend this book.”
— Kent Redford, University of Florida 
C loth  $49.95
Capitalism in 
Colonial Puerto Rico 
C entral San V icente 
in the Late N ineteen th  C entury 
Teresita Martinez-Vergne 
“A n extraordinarily im portant contribution 
to the historiography no t only of Puerto 
Rico but also of the C aribbean . . .  both in  its 
exam ination of the impact of capitalism on 
the island during the n ineteen th  century 
and its enormous contribution to  the study 
of the processes of social change in the 
critical period after the abolition of slavery.” 
— Franklin W . Knight, 
Johns Hopkins University 
C lo th  $27.95
Illustration taken from photograph o f Rio de 
Janeiro courtesy o f Museu da ImagemedoSom.
Cuban Studies 
Since the Revolution
E dited  by D am iSn Fernandez 
“Its scope is very impressive and the scholar­
ship of very high quality. It not only docu­
ments the intellectual debates that still high­
light unresolved issues, but it also provides 
the first holistic assessment of the field.”
—Juan M. del Aguila, Emory University 
C loth  $39.95
Space-Time of the 
Bororo of Brazil
Stephen Michael Fabian 
“Fabian shows how concepts of time and 
space are patterned into village layouts and 
repeated in the organization of clans and 
moieties in much the same way as charts and 
lists are devised by literate societies. In a very 
precise and engaging manner, he has con­
firmed once again that literacy is no t a pre­
requisite for rational or scientific thought.” 
— Allyn MacLean Stearman, 
University of C entral Florida 
C lo th  $39.95
— A N D  C O M IN G  T H IS  FALL
Miami N ow  
Immigration, Ethnicity 
and Social Change 
E dited  by G u ille rm o  J. G re n ie r 
a n d  A lex  S tep ick  III
September. C loth  $34.95 Paper $16.95
Politics and the Catholic 
Church in Nicaragua
Jo h n  M . K irk
September. C loth  $34.95
Debt Politics
after Independence
T he Funding Conflict in Bolivia
T h o m as M illin g to n
August. C loth  $29.95
The People who 
Discovered Columbus 
The Prehistory of the Bahamas 
W illiam  F. K eegan
September. C loth  $39.95
— N E W  P A P E R B A C K S  IN  JU LY
High Jungles and Low
A rc h ie  C a rr  $16.95
The Imperative Call 
A  N a tu ra lis t’s Q u es t in  T em p era te  
a n d  T ro p ica l A m erica  
A le x a n d e r F. S k u tc h  $16.95
A Naturalist in Costa Rica 
A le x a n d e r F. S k u tc h  $16.95
Through full-service bookstores or order 
w ith M /C or Visa toll free:
1-800-226-3822
— U N IV ERSITY  PRESS O F FLORID A
Gainesville, Tallahassee, Tampa,
Boca Raton, Pensacola, Orlando,
Miami, Jacksonville
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Reports: After the Cold War
Germany and Latin America
by Violanda Botet
n October 1991 German chan­
cellor Helm ut Kohl took his 
first extended foreign trip fol­
lowing German reunification 
to, of all places, Brazil and 
Chile. The 12-day tour was 
one of Kohl’s longest trips abroad 
and the first trip by a German 
chancellor to Latin America since 
H elm ut Schmidt visited the region 
in 1979. In speeches and private 
talks Kohl made clear the polidcal 
significance of his trip: Germany is 
not self-absorbed and the new, re­
unified Germany intends to remain 
actively engaged in Latin America 
and the Third World.
The chancellor made two sig­
nificant statements during the trip. 
The first was that the reunified Ger­
many recognized a “growing re­
sponsibility” in the world and that 
he hoped Latin America, and par­
ticularly the countries of Brazil and 
Chile, would become its “privi­
leged” partners. The second was 
his confirmation of an earlier 
pledge to donate a quarter of a bil­
lion Deutsche marks to Brazil to 
protect its tropical rain forests.
Kohl’s pledge to pursue and 
expand Germany’s ties to Latin 
America attracted surprisingly little 
criticism in the German press, 
given that the German government 
had assumed trem endous new fi­
nancial obligations and that domes­
tic economic growth was slowing.
To be sure, Germany’s foreign pri­
orities remain the Western alliance 
and Eastern Europe. The push for 
expanded German-Latin American
Violanda Botet is an attorney adviser 
with the US Department of State. The 
views expressed in the article are hers 
alone and do not necessarily represent 
those of the US government.
relations, however, is partly a re­
sponse to Latin America’s im­
proved economic and political 
situation in the 1990s.
More broadly, Germany is selec­
tively strengthening its political ties 
in regions such as Latin America, 
provided that the financial costs 
are m oderate and that the German 
government gains the opportunity 
to take a m ore prom inent role on 
political issues it regards as falling 
within its particular areas of exper­
tise. Among these issues are the 
environment, trade, and the tran­
sition from planned to market 
economies.
Latin America’s 
process of 
democratization 
and adoption of 
free-market policies 
have reawakened 
German interest.
How Much Is Too Much?
After the US, Germany is the West­
ern power with the strongest in­
terest in Latin America. O f all the 
European countries, Germany con­
ducts the largest volume of trade 
and invests the most money in 
Latin America, as well as contribut­
ing the most developm ent aid to 
the region. Germany’s cultural 
links are strong as well. More than 
five million Latin American citi­
zens are of German descent. In 
addition, German political foun­
dations, political parties, churches, 
and trade unions are active in the 
region.
Even so, Germany has been criti­
cized since World War II for lack­
ing a clear foreign policy agenda 
in Latin America. Some observers 
have discerned an overemphasis 
on foreign trade, cultural ex­
change, and developm ent aid at 
the expense of a broader and more 
meaningful political dialogue. Fol­
lowing Chancellor Schimdt’s visit 
to Latin America in 1979, Ger­
many’s interest in the region was 
especially high and the relation­
ship seemed poised for a takeoff. 
The launch never occurred, how­
ever, the principal reason being 
the deterioration of the Latin 
American economies in the 1980s.
In recent years, though, Latin 
America’s process of democratiza­
tion and adoption of free-market 
reforms have reawakened German 
interest. Further, the German ex­
perience of managing the transi­
tion from a planned economy to a 
m arket economy in the country’s 
new eastern states has sensitized its 
policymakers to the painful choices 
that Latin America’s democratizing 
regimes face. By the same token, 
Latin American leaders are soberly 
reassessing the need to make their 
industries m ore competitive in 
light of the threat that the forma­
tion of the European Community 
(EC) and the opening of Eastern 
Europe may divert foreign trade 
and investment away from Latin 
America.
Over the past three decades, 
Latin America’s share of Western 
European imports and exports de­
clined by half. And since 80% of 
Latin American exports to the EC 
consist of primary commodities 
such as agricultural products and
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minerals, Latin America’s balance 
o f trade with Europe is becoming 
m ore vulnerable than ever. The 
key factors are the possibility of 
new EC agricultural preferences 
for Eastern Europe; o f a m ore pro­
tected agricultural m arket in the 
EC if the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreem ent on Tariffs and 
Trade fails; and of increased com­
petition and stricter regulations 
with the EC’s consolidation.
Kohl’s 1991 trip to Latin Amer­
ica reflects Germany’s attem pt to 
carve out for itself a new extra- 
European role in the post-Cold War 
order. Within Europe, German 
foreign policy has moved dramati­
cally from the “West” orientation of 
the Cold War to a m ore balanced 
“W est/East” orientation. The 
emerging question is, what interest 
does Germany have in the rest of 
the world?
Chancellor Kohl’s pledge to 
increase cooperation with and aid 
to Latin America appears, to some 
observers, out of sync given the cur­
ren t strains in the German econ­
omy and the preoccupation of the 
German political establishment 
with Eastern Europe and the new 
Soviet republics. Still, there are 
o ther factors that prom pt the Ger­
m an government to expand its rela­
tions with Latin America. To begin 
with, Latin American democratiza­
tion is a fragile process and Ger­
many has a long-term tangible 
interest in keeping the region sta­
ble. It is not inconceivable that 
Latin America could revert to the 
festering trouble spot that it was 
for years, heightening the myriad 
problems like the debt crisis, drug 
trafficking, social and political 
strife, militarization, and human- 
rights abuse. In a world in which 
transnational problems increas­
ingly originate in countries where 
governments are too weak to con­
trol domestic problems, analysts in 
the German foreign ministry argue 
that, over the long term, it makes 
sense for Germany to make at least 
some minimal economic conces­
sions now to prom ote Latin Amer­
ica’s democratization process. They
maintain that view despite the feel­
ing that Germany’s own resources 
are overextended in Europe.
Likewise, the German govern­
m ent recognizes that the US is in­
creasingly reluctant, or unable, to 
play a leading geostrategic role in 
multiple areas of the world simulta­
neously. This recognition is alter­
ing the assumption that the US 
has the exclusive responsibility of 
stabilizing Latin America. In the 
future, then, there will be increas­
ing pressure on the EC to aid Latin 
America. In this context, the US 
government is looking increasingly 
to wealthy allies such as Germany 
and the EC to increase their re­
gional assistance to Latin America, 
particularly in regard to the re­
gion’s debt problem.
W hether Europe will commit it­
self to m eeting the challenge in the 
Americas is a basic question. The 
Europeans, however, are not insen­
sitive to a certain sense o f diplo­
matic justice, since they are calling 
for US help in stopping the very 
same categories of threats—politi­
cal instability, massive international 
immigration, and lost economic 
opportunities—in Eastern Europe. 
The urgency of the reforms being 
undertaken simultaneously in East­
ern Europe and Latin America may 
provide incentives for Western Eu­
rope and the US to diversify their 
traditional spheres of geostrategic 
interest.
O n a bilateral level, Germany’s 
principal goals in Latin America 
are going beyond the reinforce­
m ent of economic and cultural 
ties to encompass a concerted 
effort to encourage democratiza­
tion. The Germans see their role as 
that of providing political support 
to fledgling democracies struggling 
to carry out painful economic re­
forms. The German government 
and German political foundations 
(e.g., the Konrad A denauer and 
Frederick Ebert Foundations) will 
also step up their efforts to help 
Latin American regimes to “techno­
cratize” their democratic structures 
through political education and 
civil-administration reform. Ger­
many’s own democratization since 
World War IT and its current partici­
pation in the political reforms of 
Eastern Europe give it a certain 
nuts-and-bolts approach to democ­
racy. In Latin America—which tra­
ditionally has been long on theory 
but short on im plem entation—the 
Germans can serve a potentially 
useful role.
In the economic arena, Ger­
many wants to increase its trade 
with Latin America and offer tech­
nical assistance in debt and tax re­
structuring. With regard to trade, 
the post-World War II develop­
m ent of an export-driven German 
economy is also widely adm ired 
in Latin America and serves as a 
social-market economy model. This 
model is particularly significant to­
day since, in view of the social dis­
locations, economic problems, and 
political threats associated with 
structural adjustm ent policies in 
Latin America, the German social- 
m arket economy, as opposed to 
the US free-market economy, is an 
attractive option to many Latin 
Americans.
The core them e of German- 
Latin American relations in the 
coming decade will be that of stabi­
lizing the new democracies in the 
region and bolstering mutually ad­
vantageous trade relations. Increas­
ingly, German relations with Latin 
America will also be shaped by deci­
sions made at both the EC and bi­
lateral levels. The main threat to 
German-Latin American relations 
comes no t so m uch from a poten­
tial loss of interest on either side, 
but from events in Latin America 
itself. Political regression in Latin 
America or its failure to compete 
successfully in trade and invest­
m ent markets in Western Europe, 
North America, Eastern Europe, 
and East Asia would derail Ger­
many’s recent initiative and once 
again pull the two sides apart. ■
Editor’s Note: Abridged version of an 
article originally published in the 
German foreign relations journal 
Aussenpolitik (January 1993).
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Teeing Off: Dwight, JFK, and Fidel
by Douglas Murphy
I
n the opening m onths of 1961 
relations between the US and 
Cuba rapidly deteriorated. A 
brazen revolutionary leader 
seized prized US possessions 
on his island. Two US presi­
dents, staunch defenders of these 
assets, angrily watched his moves. 
Tensions flared. Political ties 
strained, then snapped. And at 
last, on March 31, a small band 
of soldiers, poorly trained for the 
task at hand, stormed onto a beach­
front area near Havana to chal­
lenge an overwhelming opponent. 
After hours of fierce combat, the 
mismatched skirmish mercifully 
ended and analysis immediately be­
gan. Most experts concluded that it 
was an ill-fated mission from the 
start. Even the caddy agreed that, 
when it came to golf, Fidel Castro 
was no John  F. Kennedy.
This scenario was not, of course, 
the Bay of Pigs fiasco, which un­
folded several weeks later. Instead 
it was a series of political m aneu­
vers that centered on the game of 
golf. For more than three months 
US and Cuban leaders waged an all- 
out tu rf war with the sport. While 
the Bay of Pigs assault dem on­
strated the intensity of US-Cuban 
animosity, golf revealed some of 
the “grass roots” activities behind 
the event.
Political Links
As Fidel Castro’s revolution swept 
through Cuba in the 1950s, golf 
underw ent its own radical changes 
to the north. In earlier years few 
Americans possessed the extra
Douglas Murphy is a Ph.D. candidate 
in Latin American history at the Univer­
sity of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
money and leisure time necessary 
to support the golf habit, a pastime 
previously confined to exclusive 
country clubs.
As US industries boom ed after 
World War II, however, more and 
m ore workers rose to jo in  the blos­
soming middle class, seeking out 
the perks and pleasures that came 
with higher income and a shorter 
work week. One of the most popu­
lar of these was golf, a game that 
enticed enthusiasts with more 
courses, cheaper equipm ent, and 
all the innovations of m odern tech­
nology. In a little m ore than a 
decade, repatriated soldiers and 
form er guardians of the hom e 
front became an army of civilian 
golfers—dressed in new uniforms, 
arm ed with mass-produced clubs, 
and firing ever more aerodynamic 
projectiles.
Dwight D. Eisenhower—war 
hero, president, and real general— 
led the march by honing his duffer 
skills as often as his high office per­
mitted. By 1960, with his second 
term winding to a disturbing close, 
he took to the course more and
more frequently to get a brief res­
pite from Cold War pressures. 
Photographs of the president in 
golfing attire, club in hand, be­
came such a frequent sight that 
Fidel Castro—one of the main irri­
tations of Eisenhower’s final days— 
criticized him as an incapable 
m anager who could only chase 
the little white ball ( Time, April 7, 
1961).
O f course Castro hardly repre­
sented an impartial critic of either 
Eisenhower or his sport. Since the 
revolutionary seized power, he con­
stantly challenged the US presi­
dent, charging him with imperialist 
motive, confiscating US industries 
and property, and seeking ties with 
Eisenhower’s o ther great nemesis, 
the USSR.
Likewise, Castro already had ex­
pressed ill will towards the game of 
golf. In contrast to his support of 
o ther sports, he denounced golf as 
a “game of the idle rich and exploit­
ers of the people” (New York Times, 
March 31, 1961).
The links between these two dis­
putes touched the heart of Castro’s
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revolutionary goals. After gaining 
control o f Cuba in 1958, Castro im­
mediately set about toppling the 
elites and foreigners who con­
trolled the island’s agriculture, 
industry, and politics. In a parallel 
thrust, he attacked the social trap­
pings of this influence. O n the one 
hand, he tried to abolish the drink­
ing, gambling, and debauchery 
that had become a drawing card 
for foreigners. On the other, he 
determ ined that, once free from 
oppression and vice, all Cubans 
would have equal access to the re­
maining social, cultural, and sport­
ing facilities.
Golf fell prey to this program  
on all fronts. Two of the islands 
largest landowners, the sugar giants 
U nited Fruit and Hershey, owned 
several courses for use by their 
managers. When these companies 
and the Eisenhower administration 
protested Cuba’s expropriation of 
property, Castro responded by set­
ting his sights on their land-rich 
leisure areas.
Some golfers also attracted at­
tention under new programs to 
eliminate vice. Previously foreign 
tourists entertained themselves 
with some daytime swinging before 
descending on the casinos and 
cabarets for an evening of rum, 
roulette, and prostitution. Castro 
made it clear that this type of visi­
tor was no longer welcome in the 
new Cuba.
But it was the exclusive, private 
clubs of the island that incurred 
the most outrage and sealed the 
case against the game. At the time 
of the revolution, most Cubans 
lived in squalor. For these impover­
ished masses, places like the Bilt- 
m ore Yacht and Country Club and 
the Havana Country Club—with 
their grand houses, finely groom ed 
grounds, and wealthy clienteles— 
shone as beacons of excess amidst 
the island’s general malaise.
More directly, country club 
mem bership lists bore the names 
of many prem ier enemies of the 
revolution, including deposed pres­
ident Fulgencio Batista. And it was 
in the carefully landscaped country
club neighborhoods, behind the 
closed curtains of darkened m an­
sions, that the last serious resis­
tance to revolution held forth as 
Castro’s forces stormed into Ha­
vana. If he allowed clubs to remain 
intact, Castro only invited plots 
against his power.
In light of the gam e’s multi­
faceted disfavor, Castro’s first blows 
against golf appear restrained. He 
nationalized several clubs, declar­
ing them  the property of all the 
Cuban people. The formerly US- 
owned Biltmore Club, for example, 
opened its expropriated grounds 
and beach to any citizen who cared 
to enter. Avid golfers were wel­
come to continue their pastime on 
the now unkem pt and dirty fair­
ways. Though few chose to do so, 
even form er members could pay a 
fee to use the turf.
If Castro ever considered main­
taining golf as an acceptable Cu­
ban sport, activity to the north 
probably changed his mind. On 
January 3, 1961, just days before 
Kennedy assumed the presidency, 
Eisenhower severed relations with 
Cuba. Already frustrated by Cas­
tro ’s continued intransigence, the 
president drew the line when the 
revolutionary leader dem anded a 
reduction of the US embassy staff 
in Havana. Eisenhower kept the 
event in perspective, though, by 
completing 18 holes before drop­
ping the axe (Time,January 13, 
1961).
T im e, April 7, 1961
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In the following weeks, despite 
the worst rift ever in US-Cuban 
relations, golf again seized the 
American spotlight. As their na­
tion moved towards armed conflict 
with their next-door neighbor, in­
quiring minds wanted to know who 
played better, Jack or Ike? News 
magazines recalled Kennedy’s his­
tory as a freshman golfer at Har­
vard. Photographers scrambled for 
snapshots of the president-elect’s 
scorecard. Reporters asked leaders 
of politics, business, and industry 
for opinions on how the new lead­
er of the free world m ight uphold 
Eisenhower’s legacy on the links.
Even when Castro broke into 
the news, the national craze en­
gulfed him. One political cartoon 
portrayed the change of White 
House occupancy as an exchange 
of mem bership at the “Burning 
Problems Country Club” ( Time, 
January 27, 1961). There, in addi­
tion to the arms race, the Cold War, 
and assorted o ther’issues, new 
player Jack faced Nikita Khrush­
chev’s cigar-smoking “Caddy Cas­
tro ” with his bag of clubs and 
sickles.
Despite the challenging course 
before him  and lingering doubts 
about his skills, Kennedy asserted 
himself on both the country club 
and political turfs. As Eisenhower 
bid the nation farewell, with a 
speech at the Augusta Country 
Club, Kennedy quickly took up the 
big sticks. On the political front he 
continued to press Cuba to respect 
US interests and influence. At the 
same time, though shrouding his 
game in secrecy, he received praise 
in the press and Congress for keep­
ing golf the “Presidential Game.”
Kennedy also matched his prede­
cessor at handling golf and Castro 
in the same stroke. Even before 
taking the oath of office, reporters 
spied the youthful president teeing 
off while in deep discussion with 
the form er US ambassador to Cuba. 
W hen Eisenhower severed ties with 
the island the president-elect 
golfed and conferred with his ad­
visers, but did no t challenge the 
move.
For Castro and his supporters, 
who saw their dem ands for respect 
taking a back seat to presidential 
play, the US obsession with golf sug­
gested a lack of concern with Cu­
ban relations. At the same time it 
offered itself as a source of revolu­
tionary symbolism. In the magazine 
Bohemia (January 15, 1961), for ex­
ample, a cartoonist sketched “Golf 
Latinoam ericano.” H ere a smiling 
m an swung a sledge ham m er to 
drive away the severed ball and 
chain of “Yankee Aggression.”
For Castro and his 
supporters, the US 
obsession with golf 
suggested a lack of 
concern with Cuban 
relations and offered 
itself as a source 
of revolutionary 
symbolism.
The gam e’s refuges in Cuba also 
attracted m ore aggressive interest. 
The Havana Country Club, once 
famous for its annual “Red Ball”— 
a formal event where guests and 
members decked themselves in 
crimson and scarlet—now saw the 
color in a new light. Members, who 
had always insisted that Castro was 
Communist, received word that he 
had confiscated their entire neigh­
borhood. The club became an 
academy of arts while the luxurious 
surrounding homes were pressed 
into service as barracks for revolu­
tionary youth.
O ther golfing centers also fell. 
The Cubanican recreation center, 
once the Biltmore Club, began to 
convert its links into m ore prole­
tarian playing fields. The once
beautiful greens and fairways al­
ready bore scars from antiaircraft 
batteries positioned to ward off an 
expected US attack.
Finally, attention came to rest 
upon the Colinas de Villarreal Golf 
Club, across from Havana. Castro 
nationalized this site, planning to 
make it an additional workers’ 
social center. But first he saw a 
chance to swipe the golfing initia­
tive from US politicians.
Tee Time, Revolutionary Style
On March 31, 1961, decked out in 
military fatigues, boots, and beret, 
and arm ed only with golf clubs and 
his tradem ark cigar, the Cuban 
leader played his first and only 
round of golf. Industry minister 
Ernesto “C he” Guevara and agrar­
ian reform  director Antonio Nunez 
Jimenez arrived in similar style to 
complete a sporting triumvirate. 
With crowds of reporters on hand 
to record the m om ent, the trio 
took up positions on the first tee.
Any weekend golfer could have 
predicted the ensuing rout. Even 
with one quarter of the manpower 
involved in the first battle of the 
revolution, Castro could not pull 
out a victory. Che, who had cad­
died as a teenager in Argentina, 
won with a passable 127 score on 
the par 70 course. Nunez logged a 
180 total. Castro, the rebel who 
once took refuge in the rugged 
Cuban mountains, found that the 
rolling fairways hid little but his 
ball. At the end of his round, the 
soldier retreated from the field with 
a tally of m ore than 150 strokes 
(Newsweek, April 10, 1961).
Despite this hum bling Revolu­
tionary Open, the duffers main­
tained high spirits. After beating 
his partners on the first hole, Cas­
tro boasted he could easily beat 
Kennedy. In a similar position on 
the second green, Che swore he 
could steal a match from Eisen­
hower. Not to be outdone, Nunez 
expressed confidence he could pre­
vail in head-to-head competition 
with the president of United Fruit 
Company. All this in contradiction
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of their caddy’s claim that they 
could not even top the reporters 
covering the occasion.
Castro, no doubt, secretly agreed 
with the caddy, but he had reason 
to portray his round as a political 
coup. In less than 200 fell swoops, 
he m anaged to ridicule two US 
presidents, foreign business inter­
ests in Cuba, and a large portion of 
the US population, while mimick­
ing the lack o f serious attention 
paid to Cuba by golfing politicians. 
With the real threat o f a US inva­
sion hanging over his island, Cas­
tro scoffed at the peril with an 
outing on the links.
Castro’s round received a mixed 
reception in the US. Neither Eisen­
hower nor Kennedy graced the 
event with a comment. The New 
York Times (March 31, 1961) as­
sured its readers that Kennedy 
and Eisenhower shot in the 70s 
and 80s respectively and faced no 
real threat from the revolution­
aries. And Thomas Sunderland, 
who headed the United Fruit Com­
pany, accepted the jibe in good 
hum or. He issued a press release 
stating that, based upon his typical 
displays on the course, he would 
not be surprised to lose to Nunez.
If Kennedy hoped to retake the 
golfing high ground, his next move 
failed entirely. The week following 
Castro’s round, the president flew 
off for a holiday at the Kennedy 
estate in Palm Beach, Florida.
While he consulted with his advis­
ers, he allowed the press to photo­
graph him on the golf course for 
the first time in his presidency 
(Time, April 14, 1961). The occa­
sion proved disastrous, however, as 
his first tee shot hooked wide onto 
an adjacent fairway. A second at­
tem pt bounced off the head of a 
Secret Service agent. Luckily for all 
present, Kennedy staffers had al­
ready restricted press coverage to 
the first tee and any further mis­
haps escaped public scrutiny.
As Kennedy forced analysts to 
revise their opinions of his golfing 
prowess, Castro continued to revel 
in his own round. In a speech to 
university students in Havana, he
announced that at last he had done 
enough to “deprestige” the game 
of golf (Bohemia, April 16, 1961). 
But he also noted new possibilities 
for the sport. “Now,” he added, 
“when Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Eisen­
hower want to discuss their prob­
lems with us, we’ll play a game of 
golf.” He also assured his audience 
that, with a few days of practice, he 
could guarantee a victory.
In less than 200fell 
szvoops, Castro 
managed to ridicule 
two US presidents, 
foreign business 
interests in Cuba, 
and a large portion 
of the US population, 
while mimicking 
the lack of serious 
attention paid to Cuba 
by golfing politicians.
O f course, the fairways and 
greens could no t contain the con­
flict. Even as Castro proposed his 
power summit on the links, ships, 
warplanes, and diplomats from 
both countries challenged each 
other and the two nations rushed 
towards arm ed conflict. Just days 
after Castro’s speech reached the 
press, US-backed Cuban rebels 
landed at Playa Giron in an at­
tem pt to establish a beachhead for 
counterrevolution.
Faced with the old, familiar haz­
ards, Castro again proved to be a 
better politician and soldier than 
golfer. With little difficulty, he ral­
lied the support of Cuban citizens 
while his forces crushed the at­
tackers huddled at the shoreline. 
Castro finished the day firmly in 
control o f his island.
Delinking and Relinking
The Bay of Pigs operation effec­
tively drew the union of golf and 
US-Cuban politics to a bloody close 
To the north, US officials and citi­
zens continued their fascination 
with the links. In Cuba several 
courses rem ained open, with the 
Cuban press occasionally photo­
graphing campesinos and workers 
perfecting their swings. Yet Castro 
never dabbled in the sport again. 
He had dem onstrated his true 
skills before a m uch larger gallery. 
And since Cuba had now asserted 
itself as a country that dem anded 
m ore than a few words between 
golf swings, the game fell from the 
political forefront.
From the standpoint of the 
1990s, however, Castro may have 
won a round, but lost the match.
As the Cold War putts to a halt, 
a new generation of Americans 
watches the Cuban government 
drift into political and economic 
isolation. In defiance of this drift, 
Castro now offers a green revolu­
tion. In a city of limited social pleas­
ures, the few foreign diplomats and 
investors who venture to Havana 
are encouraged to enjoy its rem ain­
ing clubs and links. Western tour­
ists, with pockets full of money, are 
invited to try Cuban golf as part of 
a Caribbean holiday. Three dec­
ades after condem ning the game 
and jeering its enthusiasts, Castro 
is trying to use golf to prop up his 
regime and to assert Cuban in­
dependence from its northern  
neighbor.
Nonetheless, most Caribbean 
countries have found that the suc­
cess of golf resorts and other tour­
ist ventures depends on a steady 
flow of guests from the US. Cuba, 
though attracting its share of visi­
tors, remains off limits to Ameri­
cans—a policy unlikely to change 
as long as Castro remains in power. 
Golf holidays for Canadians and 
Europeans may help Cuba to delay 
the return  of US influence, but it is 
the golfing colossus to the north 
that seems destined to determ ine 
the island’s future course. ■
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Reports: Gender and Migration
Haitian Women in Miami
by Sue Chaffee
“Oooh, God is taking care of me 
today. Yeah, my God send me here. 
He show me the way and now I 
have to do my part. T hat’s how God 
works. That m an m ight act crazy 
for selling me all this material for 
little money, bu t it was God that 
made him do it. W hen God see me 
walking by the m an table, he tell 
the man, ‘sell all this to her.’ Oh, I 
have so many things to be thankful 
for because of my God.”
“Everyday I’ll do this. Get up in the 
m orning and cut material. W hen I 
have a pile like this I’ll sew them. 
Sew them, pu t elastic on the waist, 
little snaps because I d on’t have 
money for buttons, so I’ll make lit­
tle snaps. And then I can sell them. 
God find me something good to 
do.”
Sue Chaffee is a graduate student in 
comparative sociology and anthropology 
at Florida International University. She 
is currently researching the economic 
strategies of Haitian women and the 
role of networking in their survival.
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“I’m so happy Jesula rents my little apartm ent. 
W hen she was in Haiti, I miss her so much. 
Everyday I cry for her. Now she’s back and my 
heart feels kontan (happy)
“W hen I was in Haiti I feel bad because my Mom doesn’t have 
good hat for her church. I want to send her something like 
this in the box I send next week.”
“My m other always told me when 
it’s M other’s Day and you are a 
m other, you are supposed to make 
something nice for your children 
so they feel special. I have to do 
that even if I have only a little 
money. They need a new wob 
(dress) so they d o n ’t feel bored. If 
they go to church and see the 
o ther children in new clothes and 
they d o n ’t have them  then they 
might feel bad. I want them  to feel 
special. My m other did that for me 
when I was a little girl in Haiti. She 
always made me feel special.”
“Se Ben passed by my house yesterday. She bring many 
things—turkey, milk, tomato paste, bread—many things. 
The day before that she was in my house and saw that I 
d idn’t have these things in my refrigerator. She’s my friend. 
Thank God I have her in my life.”
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F A X
Insider briefs on people and institutions 
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Where Logic Defies Politics
The April 1993 appointm ent of 
Roberto Robaina to head Cuba’s 
Foreign Ministry set off a wave of 
reactions from Cuba observers. As 
the youngest m em ber of the Com­
m unist Party’s Politburo, the 37- 
year-old’s experience is limited to 
rising through party ranks within 
the U nion of Young Communists. 
Even a Radio Havana com m en­
tator, Miguel de la Guardia, noted 
that “the diplomatic community 
in Havana received the appoint­
m ent with surprise.” W hat is per­
haps even more surprising is that 
Robaina replaced career diplomat 
Ricardo Alarcon, who earlier had 
been nam ed to the largely cerem o­
nious position of president of Cu­
b a’s legislature—the National 
Assembly. Some observers inter­
p ret Robaina’s appointm ent as an 
attem pt to signal the start of a re­
newal process within the govern­
m ent through the arrival of a new 
generation of leaders.
Watch Out I
Jamaica continues to lose ground 
in its struggle against violence. Ac­
cording to an Americas Watch 
report (April 1993), “the fear of 
crime continues to deepen . . . par­
ticularly vexing for the population 
is the theft of crops and livestock 
. . . giving rise to fits, vigilante 
justice and sometimes police 
violence.” But the issue of civil 
violence extends to a deeper con­
cern—state violence. The report 
states that the “level of police
Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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violence is extremely high; killings 
by police [in the last four years] 
have constituted 22 percent of all 
homicides in Jamaica (the num ber 
of killings by police that are justi­
fied is unknow n).”
Sing Along
Inspired by the success and tech­
nology of “U nforgettable”—the re­
cent musical hit in which Natalie 
Cole sings with her long deceased 
father, Nat “King” Cole—Cuban 
singer and composer Pablo Mi­
lanes will also try recording with 
the dead. It is a bold and, some 
will no doubt say, pretentious move 
by “Pablito,” for he has picked as 
singing partners two of the most 
venerated figures of the Cuban 
musical pantheon: Benny More 
and Miguelito Cuni. Milanes has 
selected ten recordings (five by 
each of the two legendary singers) 
and will be adding his own voice in 
a sophisticated sound studio in the 
Dominican Republic. The album 
will be distributed internationally 
by Polygram Records in mid-1993. 
The production launches the Pablo 
Milanes Foundation, a nongovern­
mental, nonprofit, self-financed 
institution designed to prom ote cul­
tural and artistic events. Since it is 
apparently not officially tied to the 
Cuban government, it would seem 
to be an entity with few precedents 
in Cuba’s recent history.
Where Politics Defies Logic
When Bill Clinton was elected pres­
ident, he prom ised a different 
“look” for his administration. One
of his m ore novel attempts to fulfill 
this campaign promise was the half­
hearted and ill-fated effort to name 
Mario Baeza, a New York lawyer, as 
assistant secretary of state for inter- 
American affairs. Even before the 
likely nom inee could get to Wash­
ington to display his credentials, a 
chorus of opposition developed in 
Miami and Washington. Appar­
ently Baeza was no t well-known to 
Miami’s Cuban-Americans, espe­
cially Democrats. At issue were the 
lawyer’s sympathies toward Castro, 
his connections with companies 
seeking business on the island, and 
his absence of familiarity with “the 
Cuban-American agenda.” Many 
also believe that race played a 
subtle factor—Baeza is black.
After weeks of delay and ambiva­
lence, the Baeza nom ination was 
dropped by Clinton and his advis­
ers, who were not eager to fight for 
a position that, at most, has sym­
bolic im portance in White House 
decisionmaking.
US Policy Is Working . . . 
or Is It?
Before the US trade embargo on 
Haiti, m erchandise trade between 
the two countries totaled $820 mil­
lion (1990). By 1992, however, 
trade had dropped by more than 
half to only $322 million. O f this 
amount, US exports were largely 
composed of rice, wheat, and 
sugar, while imports were mainly 
comprised of finished textile prod­
ucts. Haiti’s GDP fell 10% in 1992. 
The Haitian assembly industry has 
been hardest hit, with employment 
in that key industry falling from a 
pre-embargo high of nearly 32,000 
workers to only 12,000.
Watch Out II
Many of your favorite Axnway prod­
ucts are now available in Argentina. 
The company, based in Michigan, 
recently opened Amway centers in 
Buenos Aires, Rosario, Cordoba, 
and Mendoza.The direct-sales con­
sum er products company is already 
operating in Mexico, Central Amer­
ica, and Brazil, and expects to sell 
m ore than $10 million worth of its 
products in Argentina during 1993.
The Caribbean Connection
The Miami-based Caribbean Satel­
lite Network (CSN) had its debut 
in December 1992. The first and 
only television network to deliver 
Caribbean program m ing 24 hours 
a day, its programs focus on Carib­
bean news, sports such as cricket 
and soccer, and Caribbean music 
videos, with emphasis on reggae, 
soca, calypso, and Latin and other 
roots music. Although well-received 
in the Caribbean, CSN has not yet 
been picked up by any US cable 
companies.
Good Analysis
Some of the best analyses on the 
potential plight of the Caribbean 
in the face of the North American 
Free Trade Agreem ent (NAFTA) 
come from M anchester Trade, a 
Washington-based international 
business advisory group. Directed 
by Stephen Lande, a lawyer and for­
m er official in the office of the US 
Trade Representative, Manchester 
has organized a “Friends of the 
Caribbean” network to lobby for
the new Caribbean Basin Free 
Trade Agreements Act. The legis­
lation would provide some guar­
antees for Caribbean countries 
against the trade and investment 
diversion that NAFTA, if and when 
it is signed, may bring.
■
Worth Reading
Business Mexico is a monthly publica­
tion of the American Cham ber of 
Commerce of Mexico. Its winter
1993 special edition carries articles 
on topics ranging from “Balancing 
Mexico’s Natural Heritage with Its 
Development Future” by j. Martin 
Goebel of the World Wildlife Fund, 
to “The Nature of Good Business” 
by L. Susan Anderson of the Na­
ture Conservancy.
Fiber Optics Frenzy?
A $1 billion fiber optics network 
will link Latin America, the US, and 
the European Community by late 
1994, according to an article in the 
Journal of Commerce (May 19, 1993). 
The article quotes an AT&T offi­
cial: “There will be a double digit 
com pounding increase in traffic 
over the next couple of years once 
we deploy fiber optics to the whole 
region. . . . The growth will be a 
self-feeding situation.” The main 
obstacle to the network is, of 
course, financing. While many 
Latin American countries are 
modernizing their phone systems, 
about $30 billion will need to be in­
vested annually in telecommunica­
tions in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America to be competitive in the 
global economy.
Check It Out
The Revista Bigott focuses its entire 
October-December 1992 issue on 
tobacco in the Americas. Published 
in Caracas, the slick magazine has
10 articles on the origins and uses 
of tobacco in the Americas. Among 
the authors is Guillermo Cabrera 
Infante, whose article “Puro hum o” 
is fram ed by multicolor replications 
of the world’s most intricate cigar 
wrapper bands. For those who love 
cigars, this issue is a collector’s 
item.
Musica Caliente
MTV Music Television has an­
nounced that it will initiate a 24- 
hour Spanish-language network, 
based in Miami. The new network 
will be m arketed to 12 to 34-year- 
old Hispanics and will also be 
offered to cable operators through­
out Latin America and some parts 
of the Caribbean. The network will 
debut in October 1993.
Free Fall
Ricardo Arias Calderon, formerly 
Panam a’s vice president and now 
leader of the opposition to Presi­
dent Guillermo Endara, should 
have thought twice before resign­
ing his government position. Since 
he left the governm ent in Decem­
ber 1992, the Christian Dem ocrat’s 
popularity has plum m eted from 
18.7% in April 1992 to 7.5% in 
April 1993. The poll, conducted 
by the Dichter and Neira Company 
of Panama City, was based on inter­
views with 1,200 Panamanians.
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Peru: Into a Black Hole
by Luis Pasara
Is Peru the most tragic exception to an emerging profile of Latin American 
democratic consolidation? Or is it, in extreme form, a portent of a regional 
future of social polarization and political violence?
T he popular election of a constituent assembly in November 1992 created the impression that Peru had returned to a state of political calm and stabil­
ity. In fact, Peru is still painfully 
dragging itself through the worst 
stage in its history. The proposed 
new constitution—which would be 
drafted by a congressional majority 
loyal to the dictates of President 
Alberto Fujimori—does not repre­
sent a way out of the current im­
broglio.
Unlike Chile—where the suc­
cess of democratization reflects the 
chance convergence of the mili­
tary’s withdrawal from power and 
an economic upturn—contem po­
rary Peru’s experience with the op­
eration of chance has been entirely 
negative. Natural disasters, such as 
the two-year drought currently af­
flicting the country, contribute to 
P eru’s bad fortune. Most of its cur­
ren t problems, however, are dis­
tinctly hum an in origin.
Since the mid-1970s Peru has suf­
fered an economic collapse that
Luis Pasara is a research associate at 
the Centro Latinoamericano para el 
Analisis de la Democracia, in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina. His publications in­
clude “El rol del parlamento: Argentina 
y Peru, ” Desarrollo Economico 
(January-March 1993).
places its current GDP per capita at 
1950 levels. The governm ent’s fail­
ure to handle the economic situa­
tion has exacerbated a very grave 
process of deinstitutionalization by 
which the effective authority of the 
state is greatly reduced and the ef­
fective authority of guerrillas (i.e., 
Sendero Luminoso) expands to fill
Popular disaffection 
with political parties 
is massive, fueled by 
the perception that 
they serve only a 
narrow band of 
interests.
the gap. In this setting, Fujimori 
has em erged as a caudillo who en­
joys the approval approval of a sig­
nificant portion of the electorate. 
In short, Peru finds that it has a 
state whose effective authority is 
fast eroding.
The military governm ent of 
Morales Bermudez (1975-80) and 
the popularly elected governments
of Fernando Belaunde (1980-85), 
Alan Garcia (1985-90), and Alberto 
Fujimori (1990-) imposed drastic 
adjustm ent programs that failed to 
eliminate inflation, clean up public 
finances, or reestablish the under­
pinnings of sustainable economic 
growth. This sequence of adminis­
trations has created a disturbing 
profile of the Peruvian economy: 
chronically high inflation; a tre­
m endous decline in the value of 
economic output; a huge increase 
in the share that drug revenues 
represent in the national economy 
and in its exports; a massive debt 
burden; and a fiscally bankrupt 
state. In 1992—after more than 
two years of Fujimori’s shock treat­
m ent—the value of Peru’s GDP fell 
for the fourth consecutive time and 
the rate of inflation hovered 
around 60%. As a result, 17.6 mil­
lion of Peru’s 22 million people 
currently live in poverty and, of 
those, nearly 11 million are in­
digent.
Not surprisingly, then, popular 
disaffection with political parties is 
massive, fueled by the perception 
that political parties—whether in 
or out of office—have served only 
their own narrow interests regard­
less of the plight of the nation. For 
example, in a 1990 survey of mid­
dle to lower-class residents in Lima, 
94% of the respondents agreed 
with the statem ent that “the people 
have always been tricked by the 
politicians.”
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RECENT PERUVIAN GOVERNMENTS
Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado 1968-75
Gen. Francisco Morales Bermudez 1975-80
Fernando Belaunde Terry 1980-85
Alan Garcia Perez 1985-90
Alberto Fujimori 1990-present
Political opposition, especially 
on the left, used the economic diffi­
culties of the country to exert multi­
ple dem ands without considering 
what is possible. These demands 
have mainly been for higher sala­
ries and the preservation of gov­
ernm ent spending programs. The 
rejection of any government initia­
tive, the systematic and prem ature 
denial of any positive result from 
the policies adopted, and the in­
crease in social conflict have be­
come useful tools for those who 
hope to take over the government 
in the next electoral round. Such 
strategies and political resources 
were employed by the Alianza 
Popular Revolucionaria Americana 
(APRA) to challenge Belaunde and 
by the left to underm ine Garcia. Al­
though the APRA won the 1985 
election, the Izquierda Unida (IU) 
failed to gain power by using simi­
lar tactics in 1990. IU’s failure was 
largely because its strategy of 
strikes, stoppages, and blockades 
simply wore out the patience of the 
electorate.
U nder the Garcia presidency in 
the late 1980s, popular disaffection 
with both the adm inistration’s 
m ethods of governing and APRA’s 
stalemated relation with opposition 
parties affected the attitude of the 
electorate. While “turning their 
back” on those whom they had 
elected could generate a feeling of 
treason am ong the voters, the op­
position’s activities left the impres­
sion that social protest, such as 
marches and strikes, was incapable 
of modifying policies adopted from 
the “top.” As a result, the ineffec­
tiveness of an exhausted left was 
evidenced by the decline in voter 
support, from nearly a third in 
1975-85 to its extremely low cur­
ren t level.
One apparent expression of 
voter disapproval was the high pro­
portion of citizens who supported 
the pursuit of anticorruption 
charges against form er president 
Garcia. After the Peruvian supreme 
court ruled in 1991 that the con­
gressional accusations were ground­
less, a poll found that 60% of those 
surveyed disagreed with the deci­
sion, a finding that was virtually 
constant across all social classes. 
Only 24% of those surveyed agreed 
with the court’s ruling. Effectively 
shaping public opinion was the 
strong and widely held belief that 
Garcia had m isappropriated public 
funds and otherwise mismanaged 
the public sector.
The intensification of citizen 
disaffection with both political 
parties and individual politicians 
seems to have had two principal 
beneficiaries. The first is the Sen- 
dero insurgency, which was able to 
present itself as a viable opposition 
movement by inflicting material 
damage on both the political au­
thorities and those social groups 
deem ed responsible for the imple­
m entation of failed government 
economic policies. The “inde­
pendents,” people who lack pre­
vious political experience or links 
with traditional political parties, 
are also reaping the benefits. Exem­
plary of this phenom enon was the 
November 1989 election of televi­
sion personality Ricardo Belmont 
as mayor of Lima. A m uch more 
significant indication of this trend 
was the 1990 election of Fujimori 
as president.
Short-Term Winner #1: 
Sendero Luminoso
A 1991 survey in Lima found that 
17% of those polled believed ter­
rorist actions were justified. Among 
the poorest sectors—which com­
prise close to half o f Lima’s popu­
lation—support for terrorism 
reached 23%. Combined with the 
state’s crumbling effective pres­
ence, such sentim ent forms the 
urban foundation upon which the 
Sendero insurgency has spread 
since 1980. More than a decade 
later, the horrible scenario of Sen­
dero terrorism and the “dirty war” 
of government repression has re­
sulted in m ore than 25,000 deaths 
and material losses that are almost
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the equivalent of Peru’s $20 billion 
foreign debt.
The Sendero movement does 
not appeal to the majority of Peru­
vians. Even so, it has m anaged to 
recruit thousands of persons who 
believe in the possibility of rebuild­
ing the country’s state and society 
along the same lines advocated by 
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. 
The political impact of the Septem­
ber 1992 arrest and conviction of 
Sendero founder Abimael Guzman 
is no t yet clear. In any case, how­
ever, it is difficult to imagine the 
end of the subversive movement in 
the near future. Indeed, even if the 
Sendero movement itself were to 
fall apart, Peru’s growing poverty,
increasing social polarization, and 
progressively ineffective govern­
m ent probably ensures that m utant 
versions of the Sendero would take 
its place. According to the previ­
ously noted 1991 poll in Lima, 
while 75% of those surveyed re­
sponded that democracy was their 
preferred form of government,
81% of them  said they would sup­
port a “government that is not 
elected by the people but that is 
just and improves the situation.” 
The substantial popular support of 
both the April 1992 coup and the 
subsequent closure of congress fall 
into this same category. Hence, the 
eventual rise of an alternative sub­
versive option—less violent than
Sendero and more appealing to 
the prolonged dissatisfaction of Pe­
ruvians—is a distinct possibility.
Short-Term Winner #2: 
Alberto Fujimori
Peruvian voters have experienced 
two democratically elected govern­
ments—those of Belaunde and 
Garcia—that restricted political 
participation by controlling a rub­
ber-stamp congressional majority 
while simultaneously displaying 
considerable inefficiency in manag­
ing the economy. Against this back­
drop, Alberto Fujimori—virtually 
unknown on the national political 
scene—placed second in the presi­
dential primaries of 1990, before 
ultimately defeating the favorite, 
novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, in the 
run-off. The key reasons for Vargas 
Llosa’s surprising defeat were his 
mem bership in the discredited 
“white” elite, his bulwark of sup­
port within the equally discredited 
traditional political parties (Partido 
Popular Cristiano and Accion Popu­
lar) , and his intention to appoint 
members of these parties to posi­
tions of power.
Fujimori, in building his politi­
cal future, revealed his unequivocal 
rejection of the traditional role of 
political parties in Peru’s govern­
m ent machinery. After his inaugu­
ration in July 1990, he provoked a 
confrontation with opposition par­
ties that controlled both houses of 
congress, launching a systematic 
campaign of unfounded accusa­
tions against them. For example, 
without presenting proof, he ac­
cused the parties o f corruption, 
especially narcotrafficking. Since 
then he has continued this strategy 
with the knowledge that a vast sec­
tor of the population rejects the tra­
ditional parties and supports his 
maneuvers.
The popularity of this strategy 
is indicated by the fact that, follow­
ing the coup of April 5, 1992— 
which closed down the congress 
and the courts—public opinion 
sided overwhelmingly with a “presi­
dential dictatorship” and against a
APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL OF GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
___________________  (August 1992)_______________________________
% Approve % Disapprove
Alberto Fujimori 62 28
Government as a whole 58 28
Economic policy 40 44
Antisubversion strategy 35 53
Opposition 23 65
Political parties
Cambio 90 46 38
Frente Independiente Moralizador 25 60
Libertad 24 58
Accion Popular 21 65
Partido Popular Cristiano 21 60
FRENATRACA 17 65
Solidaridad y Democracia 16 68
Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana 12 75
Partido Unificado Mariateguista 11 72
Source: APOYO S.A. Survey in metropolitan Lima, sample size 500, age 18 and older.
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M l I PERU: ECONOMIC INDICATOR
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regime in which political parties 
exercise power through the legisla­
ture. Thus, according to an August
1992 survey in Lima, 62% o f those 
polled approved of Fujimori while 
28% disapproved of him. Fujimori’s 
party, Cambio 90, received only a 
46% approval versus a 38% disap­
proval rate, but no o ther political 
party scored m ore than 25%.
New Image, Old Style
Contrary to his cultivated image as 
a president determ ined to chart a 
radically new political course for 
Peru, Fujimori’s governing style is 
not m uch different from that of 
past Peruvian political leadership. 
Reminiscent of that tradition in 
Peru is his highly personal han­
dling of the political movement, 
Cambio 90, that served as his vehi­
cle to reach the presidency, his ca­
pricious manipulation of the rules 
during the electoral process of cre­
ating a new constituent assembly, 
and his intention to change the
constitution mainly to make his re- 
election legally possible. Like his 
predecessors, Fujimori eschews in­
stitution-building in favor o f free­
wheeling maneuvering, appealing 
to the populace for support only 
when necessary to break political 
stalemates with powerful blocs of 
elites. Even so, under Fujimori, 
Peru is undergoing a basic political 
shift: a growing rupture between 
the upper classes and, on the one 
hand, their political parties, and on 
the o ther hand, the increasingly 
impoverished citizenry. As a conse­
quence, electoral outcomes have 
become m ore erratic and dem o­
cratic governance less legitimate 
than ever.
The victors in the November
1992 election for the constituent 
assembly were pro-Fujimori “inde­
pendents.” These new legislators 
are without previous experience in 
governm ent and have no record of 
com m itm ent to public service. It is 
a parliamentary majority that will 
do whatever Fujimori requests as
long as he enjoys popular support. 
If Peru fails to register recovery in 
the economy and social welfare, 
however, this fragile coalition is 
likely to unravel.
Are there any grounds for opti­
mism? Apparently not. O n the one 
hand, the Peruvian elite is rejected 
by most of the lower social strata; 
the arm ed forces are afflicted by 
narcotrafFicking, corruption, and 
governm ent manipulation; and the 
Catholic Church is torn between 
conservative and revolutionary 
forces. On the o ther hand, the Pe­
ruvian left is in disarray. It is diffi­
cult, then, to identify any source 
for positive change in Peru. If Peru 
does not receive serious infusions 
of external aid to reconstruct its in­
stitutions, the country will continue 
its free fall into a social, economic, 
and political black hole. ■
(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
Readings and teaching 
ideas in English and 
Spanish on the conquest 
and its legacy
Poetry and prose by Latin Ameri­
can and Caribbean authors such 
as Claribel Alegria, Manlio 
Argueta, Pedro Albizu Campos, 
Ernesto Cardenal, Ruben Dario, 
Eduardo Galeano, Nicolas 
Guillen, Pablo Neruda, Gabriel 
Garcia M arquez, Rigoberta 
Menchu, Cesar Vallejo, and more.
. . .
For K-Adult Spanish, Bi­
lingual, English and Social 
Studies classes.
Edited by A m oldo Ramos, 
Gioconda Belli, et al.
Order Now: Single copies: $5 + $3 
shipping. Bulk: 10-49: $2 each; 50-499: 
$1.50 each; 500+: $1 each. Must add for 
shipping: $8 for first 10-100, $6/100 
thereafter. I.S.B.N. 1-878554-09-3, 
96pp, © 1992, NECA.
Send check, purchase order or inquiries
to NECA, 1118 22nd St, NW 
Washington, DC 20037
202-429-0137, Fax: 202-429-9766.
The Network of Educators on the Americas (NECA) distributes additional titles for teaching about the Americas. Request a catalogue. For 
example the Caribbean Connections series includes titles on Puerto Rico ($12), Jamaica ($12) and Overview of Regional History ($15.95) 
(+ $3 postage for each book.) “Here are the voices o f Puerto Rican workers, women, activists, writers and musicians. Puerto Rican students 
will find their heritage presented here with knowledge and dignity. Students and teachers o f other backgrounds will enjoy a wonderful and 
informed introduction to Puerto Rican life today.” - Dr. Rina Benmayor, Center fo r Puerto Rican Studies, Hunter College.
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Corruption and Democracy
by Carina Perelli
ince the nineteenth cen­
tury, accusations of cor­
ruption have been a 
recurring excuse for de­
posing, or attem pting to 
depose, governing au­
thorities in Latin America. While 
those accusations have been, on 
the whole, valid ones, it is almost 
inevitable that the subsequent re­
gimes are guilty of the very same 
practices. Not surprisingly, there­
fore, Latin Americans tend to re­
gard power and corruption as 
inextricably intertwined.
Given its constancy, when does 
corruption actually rise to the fore 
of public consciousness? Within 
the framework of this question, the 
details of popular attitudes toward 
corruption vary across the coun­
tries of Latin America. For exam­
ple, according to recent surveys, 
50% of urban Argentineans and 
Brazilians polled view corruption 
as the principal political problem 
of their countries. In Argentina, 
however, corruption has been tol­
erated politically because the gov­
ernm ent appears to be relatively 
successful in m anaging the econ­
omy, whereas in economically un­
stable Brazil, it led to one of the 
rare cases in which a president was 
indicted and tried for corruption.
In Argentina, tolerance is in­
deed high for the questionable ac­
tions and utterances of ministers, 
such as form er labor minister Luis 
Barrionuevo, who once said that 
“nobody has ever earned money 
working.” Consider also the state-
Carina Perelli is co-director of the 
Sociedad de Analisis Politico, in Mon­
tevideo, Uruguay. She has done survey 
research in Bolivia, Panama, Para­
guay, and Uruguay.
m ent of the highly praised minister 
of economics Antonio Cavallo, who 
declared that he requires $10,000 
monthly to live but earns only 
$2,100 monthly in his official ca­
pacity, receiving the rest in the 
form of payments from a private 
foundation. A nother example of 
public tolerance is the case of 
Gerardo Sofovich, who resigned 
as a state-appointed m anager of a
Latin Americans 
tend to regard 
power and corruption 
as inextricably 
intertwined. When 
does corruption 
actually rise to the 
fore of public 
consciousness?
television station in December 
1992, following accusations that 
he had mixed his activities as a pri­
vate producer with his government 
role. Only 55% of those surveyed in 
Buenos Aires condem ned his ac­
tions while 37% thought they 
should not have led to his resig­
nation. Behind this ambiguity is 
the perception that Argentina has 
successfully changed its course, 
and that, despite a very high social 
cost, the road has been paved to­
wards a better future.
In Brazil, on the o ther hand, Fer­
nando Collor de Mello—who was 
elected president on the grounds 
that he would end the flagrant cor­
ruption of public functionaries— 
ended his term  in January 1993 by 
resigning to avoid trial in the sen­
ate, which nevertheless imposed 
on Collor sanctions identical with 
im peachment. Still, comparing 
Collor’s case with examples of 
government corruption in other 
Latin American countries, Collor’s 
transgressions seem to lack origi­
nality. To be sure, the house that 
President Collor resided in was 
extravagant indeed, but this pales 
in comparison to the case o f Ar­
gentine president Carlos Menem, 
who rem odeled his summer hom e 
on the Atlantic coast, bought a 
$60 million jet, and is currently 
building an expensive third home. 
Argentine magazines are filled with 
stories about the residences of 
M enem ’s relatives and political 
associates, reporting that the costs 
of their homes far exceed their 
salaries. In contrast, Cesar Macri, 
Collor’s form er labor minister, was 
accused of taking a $4,000 check— 
pocket money com pared to Argen­
tina, where few misdeeds involving 
less than a million dollars merit 
public accusation.
Commonly in Latin America, 
corruption can be covered up or 
politically expunged if a function­
ary resigns, even if the offenses are 
serious. A political m achine acts to 
protect itself by complying with 
and motivating such maneuvers. 
Such action, however, is rarely 
enough. In a society like Argen­
tina, where television is one of the 
principal shapers of public opinion 
and where prom inent journalists 
like Bernardo Neudstadt shout 
“paren de robar” (“stop stealing”) , a
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potential crisis is at hand if for any 
reason confidence is lost in the cur­
ren t economic program. In that 
event Argentina could face the 
same shock wave that is rippling 
through Italy today: a profound dis­
crediting, not only of politicians 
and political parties, but of the en­
tire political system as well.
In Brazil, government leader­
ship sought to clear itself by con­
dem ning Collor. After all, Collor 
was an easy target—a “new cau- 
dillo” who gained entry to the elite 
circles of decisionmaking without 
a political party base and with a 
party machinery whose economic 
programs proved disastrous. In this 
context, the blame for the coun­
try’s profound problems was simply 
cast upon “arribista” individuals like 
Collor who failed in their task to
save the nation. Perhaps Collor did 
no t commit offenses graver than 
those of many other politicians and 
officials in Latin America. A basic 
difference, though, is that he failed 
to build adequate political coali­
tions and thus could no t erase the 
footprints o f his actions. Proof of 
this point is that another govern­
m ent accused of large-scale cor­
ruption, that of Carlos Andres 
Perez in Venezuela, survived as 
long as the entire political class 
supported Perez in the face of at­
tem pted coups launched by an alli­
ance of military factions and leftist 
groups.
What to Do?
Realistically, Latin Americans can­
not hope to eradicate corruption, 
but they can curtail it within rea­
sonable limits. To do so, however, 
all punishable acts must be prose­
cuted. Indictm ents that are not ac­
com panied by evidence, and which 
fail to lead to convictions, can be 
extremely dangerous for the stabil­
ity of political regimes if no such 
sanctions are imposed. The limita­
tions on corruption must be set by 
those who influence public opin­
ion and must be enforced on the 
actions of the political class.
Recent events suggest that the 
“new caudillos,” such as Collor and 
Peruvian president Alberto Fuji­
mori, could quickly fall from power 
if they do not have the support of 
the traditional political machines 
or if they fail to impose limits on 
the trappings of political office. 
Ironically, in the cases of Vene­
zuela and Peru, it seems that the 
violent actions of extremist groups 
are provoking a reactive solidarity 
am ong otherwise splintered politi­
cal elites. This, in turn, may be pro­
viding the glue that keeps those 
democratic regimes formally intact. 
If this is true, then the situation 
shouts all the more loudly for the 
renovation and deepening of 
democratic arrangements. ■
(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
Hemisphere•  Winter/Spring 1993
Venezuelan Alternatives
by Jennifer McCoy
Venezuelan Political Parties
Accion Democratica (AD) One of the two traditional parties and 
the current governing party; social 
democratic ideology.
Comite de Organizacion Polftica 
Electoral Independiente (COPEI)
One of the two traditional parties; 
Christian democratic ideology.
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) Split from Communist Party in 1968; 
moderate leftist ideology.
Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (MEP) Split from AD in 1968; leftist ideology.
Causa R Rising leftist party, which began as 
a workers’ party in the 1970s; won 
governorship of Bolivar state and 
mayorship of Caracas in the 1992 
elections.
A
fter m ore than three dec­
ades of being a “m odel” 
Latin American democ­
racy, why is Venezuela 
now suffering a crisis 
of political legitimacy? 
Venezuelans have experienced 
crises before—attem pted military 
coups, intense guerrilla warfare, 
party turmoil, and wildly fluctuating
oil prices. Yet these crises were over­
come, and in some cases they ac­
tually strengthened Venezuela’s 
approach to democracy. How, then, 
do we explain the paradox that a 
country with one of the world’s 
highest economic growth rates in
1991 was undergoing serious politi­
cal and social upheaval in 1992?
In 1992 Venezuelans were suf­
fering from m ore than the Latin 
American impact of economic scar­
city, including cynicism toward the 
political class. In addition, they 
were questioning the very direction 
in which the country may, and 
should, be heading. These prob­
lems can be seen not only in the 
resistance of vested interests to 
changes in their accustomed eco­
nomic and political privileges, but 
also in the popular tendency to 
blame scapegoats for the country’s 
ills and to look for saviors to ease 
the burdens of economic scarcity.
Does the Venezuelan crisis re­
flect unique national conditions?
O r does it reflect patterns common 
to Latin American countries under­
going similar processes of eco­
nomic and political liberalization?
Jennifer McCoy is associate professor of 
political science at Georgia State Univer­
sity. She is co-editor o/'Democracy un­
der Pressure: Politics and Markets 
in Venezuela (Caracas: Nueva So- 
ciedad, forthcoming).
Arguably, the Venezuelan crisis 
reflects broader Latin American 
trends. Prime among these is the 
difficulty of gaining support for 
short-term economic sacrifices in 
exchange for long-term improve­
ment, particularly without strategies 
of communication or alliance- 
building to win that support. Over­
looking these two strategies is com­
m on to governments undergoing 
economic liberalization, which 
tend simply to impose policies of 
austerity and adjustm ent on their 
citizenry.
The Venezuelan case illustrates 
something else as well: the role of 
normative legitimacy in sustaining 
a democratic regime, even when 
the government in power is un­
popular or discredited. So far, at 
least, Venezuelan public opinion 
still appears to favor a democratic 
polity to an authoritarian alterna­
tive. This view seems to likewise be 
true in o ther Latin American coun­
tries, such as Brazil, where disen­
chantm ent with the Fernando
Collor de Mello governm ent had 
become widespread.
As has occurred in o ther Latin 
American countries, Venezuelans 
have made political leaders scape­
goats for their country’s problems. 
Intriguingly, the popular percep­
tion of corruption in Venezuela 
seems to be higher now than in 
the 1970s, when real corruption was 
at its peak. Related to the issue of 
political scapegoating is a tendency 
to embrace a “savior”—whether it 
be rising oil prices for Venezuela, 
Mercosur for Uruguay, or a charis­
matic leader in general—rather 
than face the need to adapt to 
current realities. In nascent form, 
these tendencies are reflected in 
the widespread support am ong the 
poor and the increasingly impover­
ished middle classes in Venezuela 
for the anticorruption and anti­
politician message of antiestablish­
m ent personalities such as coup 
leader Hugo Chaves. These pat­
terns are widespread across Latin 
America as the region strives to
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adjust to a changing international 
economy, revise social policies, and 
restore confidence in political insti­
tutions so badly damaged by cen­
tralization, presidentialism, and 
mismanagement.
Venezuela exhibits many of to­
day’s general problems o f imple­
m enting economic reform. These 
problems are not, however, the pri­
mary sources o f its current political 
crisis. Instead, the roots o f the cri­
sis lie in Venezuela’s particular 
solutions to general dilemmas of 
democracy: an overemphasis on 
governability, illustrated by tight 
party discipline and control, at 
the expense of representation and 
participation; satisfying demands 
through oil revenues rather than 
domestic taxation; and decision­
making by an exclusive circle of 
elite groups. Finally, the Venezue­
lan crisis reflects the larger limits of 
a model of capitalist democracy 
that has proved unable to both pro­
mote the m arket and protect the 
populace from its negative conse­
quences. What, then, are the pros­
pects for Venezuelan democracy? 
Three scenarios are possible.
The Optimistic Scenario
The first scenario is an optimistic 
one. In this scenario, pressures 
from below lead political parties 
and governing officials to intro­
duce more decentralized and par­
ticipatory arrangements. A revised 
social contract between state and 
society would minimize citizen 
expectations of what the state can 
provide. A m ore consultative proc­
ess o f making decisions would in­
corporate a wider array of social 
and economic interests in the mak­
ing of policy and would open de­
bate over developm ent strategy to 
address not only economic growth 
but social needs as well.
W hat are the prospects for such 
a self-generating renewal? Some 
positive signs are recent electoral 
reforms allowing for direct elec­
tions of governors, mayors, and 
municipal councils and for single­
m em ber district representation for
50% of the municipal council and 
national legislative seats. These re­
forms represent a significant step 
toward decentralized governance 
and the direct accountability of 
elected leaders to voters. Already 
the impact of these changes can be 
seen in the increased popularity of 
local leaders over national ones. 
The December 1992 reelection 
and expansion of opposition par­
ties, at the cost of the ruling Accion 
Democratica (AD) party, as well as 
the surprising victory of the Causa 
R candidate in the Caracas mayoral
The roots of 
Venezuela’s crisis 
lie in its particular 
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overemphasis on 
governability, oil 
revenue, and elite 
decisionmaking.
race, indicate the potential for 
healthy multiparty elections, at 
least at the local and regional lev­
els. The 1992 electoral successes of 
no t only the Comite de Organi­
zation Politica Electoral Inde- 
pendiente (COPEI), the major 
opposition party, but also Causa R, 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), 
and Movimiento Electoral del 
Pueblo reflect this potential. The 
dom inance of the two traditional 
parties at the national level will be 
tested in the legislative and presi­
dential elections of December 1995.
O ther evidence in support of 
the optimistic scenario includes 
opinion polls showing that Vene­
zuelans want a more productive
economy and want to work harder 
to achieve it. Further, the ambiva­
lence o f public opinion about the 
economic role of the public and 
private sectors opens up the possi­
bility of reduced expectations 
about the state’s role in economy 
and society.
This optimistic scenario will not 
come true, however, unless Vene­
zuelans overcome some major 
obstacles. It will require the incor­
poration of new interests in the 
governing process, new modes 
of political negotiation and com­
promise, and new ideas on eco­
nomic productivity. And it will 
require political leadership willing 
to emphasize the long-term, gen­
eral interests o f Venezuelans rather 
than the short-term, electoral inter­
ests of particular parties and indi­
viduals.
The Survival Scenario
The second scenario is the “m ud­
dling through” or survival scenario. 
In this scenario, democratic poli­
tics will survive in Venezuela but 
will neither solve nor exacerbate 
pressing national problems. A first 
variant of this scenario involves the 
retaining of power by traditional 
parties through “el tomo” and the 
bipartisan electoral model of the 
past. The current economic policy 
would be maintained, but with 
some concessions to the demands 
of particular interest groups. Infla­
tion and deficits would rise, though 
not to insupportable levels. Grad­
ual change would be possible 
through m odest political and eco­
nomic reforms, yet would be slow 
in coming due to the resistance of 
entrenched political and economic 
interests. A second variant involves 
an independent candidate winning 
the 1993 presidential election, 
while incorporating the traditional 
parties into the new government 
and m aintaining the broad lines of 
current economic reforms.
This scenario requires, however, 
continued popular support for 
democratic politics and congres- 
| sional support for tax reform  and
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electoral and political party re­
form. W hether the first or second 
variant of the muddling-through 
scenario comes to pass will depend 
in large part on the populace’s loy­
alty to the traditional parties and 
the depths of its general alienation 
from politics. Although this cannot 
be predicted before the December
1993 elections, the December 1992 
elections give some indications.
The turnout rate, though low, 
showed some im provem ent over 
the high abstention rates of 1989, 
with 55% voting in Caracas (com­
pared to only 30% in 1989) and 
54% voting nationwide (compared 
to 46% in 1989). Still, this relatively 
low turnout rate reflects continued 
voter alienation and was a particu­
lar blow to President Carlos Andres 
Perez, who had called for voters to 
turn out to defend the democratic 
regime and to repudiate the coup 
attem pt of November 27, 1992.
In addition, the victories of the 
opposition parties beyond COPEI 
indicate voter attraction to alterna­
tives to the traditional bipartisan 
model of AD-COPEI.
The Pessimistic Scenario
The third scenario is a pessimistic 
one in which the political and eco­
nomic crisis deepens and either a 
demagogic autocrat is elected or 
a military coup succeeds. This sce­
nario could be brought on by in­
ertia a n d /o r  social explosion. In 
terms of inertia, a continued politi­
cal stalemate prevents the making 
of the tough choices required to ad­
dress deepening economic scarcity, 
corruption, and judicial ineffective­
ness. Such inertia is likely to lead to 
a social explosion, particularly if 
the grim economic forecasts for
1993 and 1994 come true. With 
continued weak oil prices, a fiscal 
deficit of 7-8% is likely in 1993 un­
less taxes are increased and spend­
ing is cut. This situation points to 
the prospects of higher inflation, 
social unrest over higher prices 
a n d /o r  cuts in subsidies, and de­
clining investment as uncertainty 
rises.
The inertia variant could pro­
duce a populist or demagogic 
candidate who wins wide popular 
support, but who fails to gain legis­
lative support and resorts to auto­
cratic rule. Alternatively, a social 
explosion in response to economic 
hardship could lead to the direct 
intervention of the military to pre­
serve social order. Either way, the 
pessimistic scenario implies that 
Venezuela has no t reached the 
depths of its potential crisis, and 
that the motivation for substantial 
positive change will occur only 
after those depths have been 
reached. Although the violence 
of the second coup attem pt of
1992 may have brought wider re­
pudiation and fear of a military al­
ternative, the deep disillusionment
with the current political leader­
ship and practices remains. As a 
result, there remains the possibility 
that nondem ocratic alternatives 
will be sought by various social 
sectors.
In the final analysis, the pros­
pects for Venezuelan democracy 
depend on several factors:
■ the ability of Venezuelan citizens 
to resist appealing to a “savior” to 
lift their country out of its cur­
ren t situation;
• the willingness of political and 
economic elites to sacrifice their 
own short-term interests for the 
national, long-term good; and
• the reevaluation of the relevance 
of past solutions for the demo­
cratic dilemmas and choices of 
today. ■
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Cheddi Jagan and Democracy
An Interview by Anthony P. Maingot
Elected for the first time in 1953, Cheddi Jagan returns to the presidency of 
Guyana with his reputation for honesty and dedication to his people intact. 
He faces many of the same problems, however, not the least of which are 
the ethnic cleavages so evident in the 1992 election
ell me whatfirst comes 
to mind when asked to 
recall your struggle for 
democracy in Guyana.
Well, somebody asked 
me after I won: how do you feel?
I said I d o n ’t feel any different. In 
o ther words, we always accepted 
the realities o f our situation and re­
alized that we had to struggle and 
stay at it persistently, patiently. We 
have not made many mistakes as 
an opposition party and thus we 
were able to repeatedly win elec­
tions.
In the context of the Cold War 
and the strategies and tactics of lib­
eration, we can say that we had a 
correct approach and that’s what 
sustained us. For example, we 
could have taken the route of El 
Salvador, but we d idn’t. We recog­
nized the balance of forces, but 
mostly we realized that our elec­
toral way was better. The proof of 
this is that we have obtained power 
while discussions for power sharing 
are still going on in El Salvador.
Editor’s Note: This interview with 
Cheddi Jagan, president of Guyana, 
took place in Miami on November 30, 
1992.
Recently, Professor Arthur Schlesin- 
ger apologized for US actions in 
1962. How did those actions color 
your perceptions of US policy back 
then and have those perceptions 
changed?
At that time the missile crisis, 
and before that the Bay of Pigs in­
vasion of Cuba, had clouded all per­
spectives on the hem isphere. We 
became the victims of that anti­
communist hysteria. Guyana, it was 
thought, was becoming not only 
independent but another Cuba; 
even more dangerous, because 
Cuba, being an island, could be 
surrounded and blockaded, not 
Guyana. Although I made every ef­
fort to assuage these perceptions 
by going directly to the Latin Amer­
ican group at the UN and stating 
that if that was the major concern 
of the West, then we were prepared 
to sign a treaty, like Austria had, 
making Guyana a neutral country 
guaranteed by UN powers. I even 
went beyond that and said that 
upon independence the governor 
general would be appointed by the 
opposition in parliam ent and that 
he would have veto powers on ques­
tions such as the importation of 
arms or the leasing of military 
bases to foreign countries. Despite 
our democratic behavior and prom ­
ises of neutrality, nobody was pre­
pared to listen because of the
existing hysteria. So we became 
the victims of indiscriminate anti­
communism.
We were, therefore, very glad 
that the Nation provided Professor 
Schlesinger the opportunity in 1990 
to say that he was sorry for what the 
Kennedy administration had done 
30 years ago (see insert on p. ??). 
But I had to rem ark that the injus­
tice was not done just to me, but 
more seriously to the country and 
to the people. The consequences 
were grave for them. W hen I was 
head of the government in the 
1960s, Guyana’s socioeconomic 
level was in second place in the 
Caribbean. It was bracketed with 
“the big four”—Guyana, Trinidad, 
Jamaica, and Barbados. Today, 30 
years later, Guyana has the lowest 
developmental status of the whole 
hemisphere, even lower than Haiti. 
Fatally, half our population now re­
sides abroad, a massive brain drain 
from which we will take years to 
recuperate.
As the most recent elections show, 
Guyana is quite evidently still po­
larized on racial grounds. What 
will you do to minimize this situa­
tion?
First of all, let me make a clarifi­
cation. The analysis of Guyana’s 
politics is sometimes too simplistic. 
When one says that politics is all
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racial, one should not disregard 
the issue of social class. Especially 
in the 28 years since Burnham  and 
the People’s National Congress 
(PNC) came to power, a new com­
prador bourgeoisie has emerged. 
And, therefore, you had, for in­
stance, in the PNC regime not a 
“black” government ruling in the 
interest of the black people who 
are in their majority working class. 
Rather, it was at the service of the 
black and Indian elite. That is why 
during the last campaign we had 
what we called in Guyana, the Com­
mittee for the Re-election of Hoyte 
(CREEP), made up of wealthy In­
dians who had planned to raise
35 million Guyana dollars for the 
reelection of Hoyte and the PNC.
On the o ther hand, we of the 
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) 
had multiracial unity. In the oppo­
sition Patriotic Alliance for Democ- 
racy/PPP grouping, for instance, 
there were five parties. Also in op­
position to the PNC were six trade 
unions: two in sugar, two in baux­
ite, one in the civil service, and an­
other in the clerical field. These 
represented all the races. At the 
religious level, there were two bish­
ops (one Anglican who was black 
and one Catholic who was Indian) 
who played a very big role in the 
struggle for fair and free elections.
Let me ask you a subsidiary ques­
tion regarding race and elections. 
When you first came into power 
in Guyana in 1953 and then won 
again in 1957, the electoral system 
used was the traditional British sin­
gle-member constituency or “first- 
past-the-post” system, which 
divided the country into constitu­
encies that elected, on a simple 
majority basis, only one candidate 
each. In this system, there is sel­
dom a relationship between the 
number of seats won and the over­
all vote for a particular party. The 
PPP tended to win many more 
seats than its overall vote would 
warrant proportionately. This led 
the US, as Schlesinger points out in
his book, A Thousand Days, to 
pressure the British into changing 
the system to one of proportional 
representation specifically to deny 
you power. What are your thoughts 
about the system most suited to 
Guyana today?
As you know the PNC ran three 
suspect elections in a row with the
proportional representation sys­
tem. That was the only way to de­
feat us. Be that as it may, I would 
still say that there are certain advan­
tages to that system, just like there 
are with the first-past-the-post one. 
There are minuses and pluses to 
both.
O ur present system of propor­
tional representation is too com-
Jagan with Jawaharlal Nehru, Delhi, 1953
Jagan talks to his supporters during a 1961 election victory celebration.
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Schlesinger’s Apology
Cut now to the Nation office 26 years later. O ur guest and  speaker 
at a seminar for the Nation staff and interns is Cheddi Jagan, three 
times popularly elected prim e minister of British Guiana prior to 
its independence in  1964 and today the leader of Guyana’s largest 
political party. Jagan wrote in a book, The West on Trial: The Fight 
for Guyana’s Freedom (Seven Seas Books, 1966), in which he 
charged but for US intervention, he and his party would have 
won the Guyanese election of 1964 and ushered the country into 
its new era of independence (and perhaps, we would add, have 
avoided some o f the bloodshed, racial conflict, misery, and chaos 
that came in the wake of his party’s defeat). As p roof of Kennedy 
administration intervention, he cited A Thousand Days, in which 
Arthur Schlesinger said he reported  to the president that Jagan’s 
opponents “would cause us many fewer problem s.” Jagan was 
under suspicion because o f his Marxist wife and his leftist politics, 
as evidenced by his responses during a “Meet the Press” interview, 
and, writes Schlesinger, there was a way to beat him. Jagan’s parlia­
mentary strength was larger than his popular strength: he had 
won 57% of the seats on the basis of 42.7% of the vote. An obvi­
ous solution would be to establish a system of proportional repre­
sentation, which on Schlesinger’s recom m endation and with the 
collusion o f the British, was finally done. Jagan was out.
Enter Professor Archie Singham, m em ber o f the Nation’s edito­
rial board, long-time Caribbeanist and activist-scholar. At Sing- 
ham ’s suggestion, we sent a copy of relevant passages of Jagan’s 
book to Schlesinger, suggesting that the Pulitzer Prize winner jo in  
the seminar. The Cold War must indeed be over: Schlesinger, 
who has had a long but uneasy history with the Nation, called to 
say he would accept, with great anticipation.
Those present witnessed a rare thing: a private public apology. 
Schlesinger was quick to say, “I felt badly about my role 30 years 
ago.” He conceded that Jagan was right about US intervention, al­
though he said the US was motivated less by a security concern 
about a communist threat in the hem isphere than by a domestic 
political concern. ‘T h ere  was a great feeling after the Bay of Pigs, 
where the impression arose that Eisenhower had prepared an 
expedition to get rid of Castro, that Kennedy had lacked the reso­
lution to follow through it. It was jus! politically going to look very
bad if the dominoes began to fall in South America___ The fear
was that Congress m ight use aid to British Guiana as a m eans of at­
tacking the whole aid bill then before it-----T hen of course what
really happened was the CIA got involved, got the b it between 
its teeth and the covert action people thought was a chance to 
show their stuff. . . .  I think a great injustice was done to Cheddi 
Jagan.”
Editor’s Note: Excerpted with permission from, an editorial in the Nation, 
June 4, 1990.
plex and confusing, but it gives 
you an exact reflection of the real 
vote of the people and how they 
should be represented in parlia­
ment. Nonetheless, it does have 
the deficiency of encouraging the 
creation of a multiplicity of parties 
based on race, religion, and any 
and all kinds of nonsense.
First-past-the-post is not as dem o­
cratic in representation, but it is 
more efficient and stable in terms 
of presenting and representing con­
stituency views and interests. It ob­
viously favors the larger parties, 
which means that small parties on 
the left could never get represen­
tation in parliament.
So, what are we going to do?
We had proposed in 1961 and 1962, 
in a conference in London, that 
the best system for Guyana was the 
mixed system such as those o f Ger­
many and Suriname.
Absolutely. That’s what the Consti­
tutional Reform Commission of 
Trinidad recommended in 1974.
This is of interest to us because 
we are going to set up mechanisms 
similar to a constitution reform 
commission to look at the whole 
constitution, including the elec­
toral system.
How do you feel today about the 
follozmng: (a) the decline of the 
socialist bloc and the global push 
towards free enterprise and com­
petition between open economies; 
and (b) the emphasis on privatiza­
tion?
I have always said that social­
ism d idn’t come from the skies. It 
came into being as a system largely 
because of the misery that the capi­
talist system in England and else­
where brought about. Marx and 
Engels’s thesis contains certain ide­
als that are m ore or less the same 
as the ideals of the early Utopians 
and even the early Christians. I 
would say that those ideals are still 
valid. One sees that in the way relig­
ions constantly speak of protecting 
the poor. For instance, the Pope
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recently talked about the evils of an 
unethical capitalism that marginal­
izes large segments of the popula­
tion.
You are saying, then, that those 
ideals are not the exclusive domain 
of socialism?
T hat’s right.
How about the competition be­
tween open economies, a new 
dogma that some are calling neo­
liberalism, but which, of course, 
has very deep roots in capitalist 
thought?
In the case o f Guyana, it is true 
that we had, in general, a similar 
ideological, philosophical outlook 
as the Eastern European countries 
and the form er Soviet Union, but 
our practice was different. They 
emphasized economic, social, and 
cultural rights, but they were short 
on hum an civil and political rights. 
We, in Guyana, despite all the prob­
lems we faced and now face, intend 
to emphasize all these rights. So I 
would say had the West not moved 
in to destabilize the PPP govern­
m ent in Guyana, today we would 
have what is called “socialism with 
a hum an face.” This to us means 
efficient managem ent, fair wages, 
good governance, and democracy. 
PPP administrations dem onstrated 
this capacity very clearly.
The point is that sometimes you 
may need privatization and this can 
take different forms. So, I take an 
inflexible position as to w hether it 
is right or wrong but look at the 
issues, case by case and in relation 
to the entire developm ent process. 
By the way, people now say Guyana 
has one of the most open econo­
mies am ong CARICOM nations. 
Isn’t this paradoxical?
One of the most intractable prob­
lems confronting world leaders is 
the tension between sovereignty 
(including the Doctrine of Non- 
Intervention) and cases of appall­
ing human rights abuses in certain
states. How do you feel about hu­
manitarian interventions generally 
and in this hemisphere specifically?
One has to be very careful about 
intervention under any rubric. 
There might be cases, for instance, 
where one might be intervening in 
the name of hum an rights, but the 
real motivations might be differ­
ent. And, yet, one cannot ignore 
the UN Convention on Hum an 
Rights. We, in Guyana, certainly 
subscribe to it. There ought to be 
a growing realization am ong state 
leaders that if they violate rights, 
any rights, whether they be civil, po­
litical, economic, social, or cultural, 
they are going to have troubles. 
Remember Gorbachev’s famous 
statem ent that what obstructed the 
Soviet economy—hindered eco­
nomic and productive forces—was 
the bureaucratic com m and type of 
government and administration. 
T hat’s why we, in Guyana, are insist­
ing that you must have democracy 
at all levels (central, local, munici­
pal, district, and even in the work 
place in terms of worker partici­
pation) .
But let’s take the case of Somalia, 
for instance, which is heading to­
wards a massive military interven­
tion. How would Guyana vote in 
cases like that?
T hat’s a very serious situation 
there because millions are dying 
from hunger . . . and people are 
willing to give assistance. It is not 
up to individual countries, but to 
the UN to deal with such cases.
If there is to be any kind of inter­
vention, it must be through the 
UN, not a case where some coun­
tries move in and then ask the UN 
to baptize it. I have always believed 
that there has to be the rule of law, 
international law governing state 
behavior. ■
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Guyana ’92: It’s About Time
by Gary BranaShute
I
 wouldn’t be the first to say that 
the Caribbean is in a constant 
process of redefinition. When 
I went to Guyana in 1983, 
Forbes Burnham  was president, 
my friends addressed me as 
comrade, the Pegasus Hotel was a 
watering hole for Cuban and North 
Koreans, and I dined on chicken 
and cheese sandwiches washed 
down with a soapy-tasting rice-brew 
called Banks beer.
W hen I returned to the Pegasus 
in 1992 to observe the elections as 
a m em ber of the Council of Freely 
Elected Heads o f Government led 
by form er US president Jimmy 
Carter, everything had changed, 
including the name of the hotel.
At the European-owned Forte Crest 
nee Pegasus, I was greeted by an 
English m anager and serenaded 
by the Platters over the restaurant 
speakers while I ate a d inner of 
pork medallions accompanied by 
im ported beer. The bill was less 
than US $10. Later that night I 
adjourned to the Palm Garden 
nightclub on Main Street to find 
Georgetown’s nouveau yuppie class 
spending their privatization dollars 
and scheming to cash in on divest­
ment, the booming gold conces­
sions, the collapse of the parallel 
exchange rate (US $1=G $134), 
foreign investment, and the widely 
conceded fall of the People’s Na­
tional Congress (PNC). O n dis­
covering that I was on the Carter 
team, an Indo-Guyanese patron 
greeted me by saying, “Boy, are we 
glad to see you here.” Not every­
body was.
Gary Brana-Shute is an anthropologist 
at the US Department of State’s Foreign 
Service Institute.
It is im portant to keep in mind 
that in the 28 years of extraordi­
nary corruption preceding the 
most recent election, a loss at the 
polls led automatically to charges 
of electoral fraud. The slightest pro­
cedural mistake or oversight, hon­
est or not, was taken by the parties 
participating as clear and compel­
ling evidence that chicanery was 
afoot. As for the voters, they wanted 
absolute perfection and would take 
any departure from that as proof 
of massive vote-rigging. Not sur­
prisingly, Georgetown was in a
dour m ood in the days prior to 
the election.
Eleven parties would contest the 
general election, although only 
four—the People’s Progressive 
Party (PPP)/Civic, the PNC, the 
Working People’s Alliance (WPA), 
and the U nited Force (TUF)— 
stood a chance of capturing votes 
from the 395,000 voters who would 
be casting ballots in Guyana’s 10 
districts.
Certain areas were locked up 
from the start; the solidly Indo- 
Guyanese Corentyne was PPP; and
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the Afro-Guyanese dom inated 
bauxite areas of Linden and Kwak- 
wani were in the PNC bag, as were 
such Georgetown neighborhoods 
as Plaisance, Tiger Bay, and Al- 
bouystown. The mixed urban mid­
dle class and Amer-Indians in the 
Rupununi would go over to TUF, 
reflecting the influence of white 
cattle herders and Jesuit mission­
aries (who saw themselves as a 
bulwark against “socialism” and 
“com m unism ”). Up for grabs and 
most likely to see violence were the 
hotly contested and racially mixed 
Georgetown neighborhoods of 
Charlestown, South Ruimveld, 
South Penitence, Queenstown, 
and Charity—as well as the coastal 
towns of New Amsterdam, Berbice, 
Essequibo, and West Demerara.
In sum, 60% of the eligible voters 
lived within 45 minutes of the po­
litical ground zero at Georgetown.
As the rank and file engaged in riot­
ing during and after election day, 
party leaders exacerbated tensions 
by refusing to declare w hether or 
no t they would accept electoral 
results—even if they were certified 
as open and fair.
Suspicion became rife when it 
was rum ored that the South Flor­
ida firm contracted to print the 
ballots had printed an excess of 
90,000 over the num ber of regis­
tered voters. Worse, the logo of the 
East Indian dom inated coalition, 
PPP/Civic, appeared on the ballot 
only as PPP. Rancorous debate fol­
lowed as to whether this was a PNC 
plot to portray the PPP/Civic as a 
single ethnic group party and thus 
to undercut its appeal across ethnic 
lines. Party leaders Cheddi Jagan 
and Samuel Hinds decided at the 
last m inute to let the logo stand as 
it was, concluding that any protest
would give the ruling PNC a pre­
text to fatally postpone the elec­
tions.
More ominously, the “disci­
plined forces” (about 6,000 sol­
diers, police, militia, and prison 
guards) were allowed to vote a 
week before the national election 
so that they could be available on 
election day to control violence. 
Violence, however, was very nearly 
touched off by the process, as a lo­
gistical logjam at the one polling 
station caused long lines of frus­
trated officers to wait until almost 
m idnight to vote. Tempers flared 
and m ore than 300 o f those offi­
cers never made it into the voting 
booth. They were later given dis­
pensation to vote with the public 
on general election day, but the 
widely asked question was inevita­
ble. Was this a PNC plot to sow 
fear, arrange another postpone-
Under Cheddi 
a day’s pay could buy
LB CHICKEN 
LBS FLOUR 
GL RICE 
LB SUGAR 
LB SALT
1/2 PT PEAS 
1 LB GARLIC 
1 PT COOKING OIL 
1 LB MARGARINE 
1 GL KERO 
1 CK SOAP
A brand new car was $4000.00 
brand new motor cycle was $400.00 
A brand new bicycle. $110.00 
Rent was $4.00 
Lightbill was $1.00 
Dem was good days 
W hen we dollar was a real dollar
7 Years under 
PRESIDENT HOYTE
a day’s pay can’t even 
buy one gallon rice.
New car costs G$3. M. 
New motor bike - $150,000. 
New bicycle - $6,000.
UMPTEEN devaluations 
G$1.00 less than US1*
Foreign debt US2.1 Billion
NO ROOM TO RENT
JUD G E for yourself, who is the better manager? 
The power to STOP the destruction is in your hands. 
R ight the wrong done to this man.
VOTE PPP/CIVIC
PAID ADVERTISEMENT
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m ent pretext, or rig the ballot? 
While the answer remains unclear, 
the event did no t affect the results 
significantly.
Doubt was also raised about the 
neutrality of the Elections Commis­
sion officials—dubbed presiding 
officers—who would m onitor the 
polling places as agents of the gov­
ernm ent along with representatives 
of each political party. Rank-and- 
file presiding officers, appointed to 
those positions during the last two 
decades of PNC power, were widely 
suspected of being PNC cat’s paws. 
To ameliorate the fear of presiding 
officers rigging the election, Rudy 
Collins, the Elections Commission 
chair, prom ised that for every “old 
tim er” there would be a “new” pre­
siding officer appointed to serve at 
his side. Further, should there be 
allegations of presiding officers 
prohibiting persons from voting 
or simply not showing up to open 
the polls, a special “rapid deploy­
m ent force” of nonpartisan officers 
would be at the ready to drive or fly 
to any affected polling station.
The neutral Stabroek News and 
the PPP-aligned Mirror were crank­
ing at full speed, encouraging the 
public to hang tough. After 20 
years the latter paper had been al­
lowed to im port a new press and 
printing materials, although I use 
the term “new” very loosely, having 
seen better presses at work printing 
college newsletters. Pre-election es­
timates of 30,000 people without 
national identification cards raised 
the nightm are of disenfranchise­
ment, despite a voter’s presence on 
the registration list. Mechanisms 
were put in place to allow anyone 
on the list with any sort of identifi­
cation (driver license, passport, 
medical insurance card) to vote.
For those lacking even that, a 
sworn oath (on a Bible, Koran, or 
the constitution of Guyana) that 
they were the person on the list, 
coupled with the personal identifi­
cation of two other voters, would 
suffice.
Stories o f governm ent drivers 
abandoning ballot boxes on their 
way to delivering them  to polling
sites were ram pant. Then there was 
the perennial story about the ink 
smeared on the fingers to indicate 
com pleted voting; it could be easily 
wiped off with bleach, the rum or 
went, thus perm itting multiple vot­
ing. Despite this particular, or per­
haps because of it, Guyanese voters 
had enough ink on their fingers to 
transcribe Shakespeare for a week. 
General calm prevailed, however, 
as everyone knew the outside world 
was watching. No less an illustrious 
cast than Jimmy Carter, Belize 
prime minister George Price, and 
the US, British, and Canadian em ­
bassies made it clear that Guyana’s 
future was riding on a straight-up 
contest.
Stories of government 
drivers abandoning 
ballot boxes on their 
way to polling sites 
were rampant, as 
were fears of multiple 
voting.
Election Day
I was posted in the town of Lethem 
on Guyana’s border with Brazil. 
Lethem is a PNC-dominated gov­
ernm ent outpost surrounded 
by settlements of Macushi and 
Wapishiana Amerindians. It can 
only be reached by land rover over 
hardscrabble laterite roads. My 
four polling stations in this rugged 
town totaled about 1,000 voters.
O ur roles as members of the Car­
ter team were many. Prime among 
them  was the vital function of pro­
viding a “quick-count” sample. One 
of those making this initial count, 
Robert Pastor, executive secretary 
of the Council of Freely Elected 
Heads of Government, described 
the process: “. . . despite the dan­
ger and uncertainty, at 6:00 p.m.
as the voting ended, our entire 
delegation went to polling sites in 
every region o f the country to con­
duct the ‘quick-count.’ By 2:00 a.m. 
the Elections Commission had com­
piled less than 1% o f the vote, but 
the quick-count had received a 
scientific sample o f about 12% of 
the vote, which showed that the 
PPP/Civic had clearly won. Be­
cause of reports of stolen or lost 
ballot boxes and the Election Com­
mission’s slow compilation of the 
results, there were fears the elec­
tion could be stolen in the count. 
The fact that President Carter 
knew the results and had com­
m unicated them  in confidence to 
President [Hugh Desmond] Hoyte 
and Mr. Jagan provided a base-line 
from which to measure the actual 
count. . . .  If the final results were 
at variance from the quick-count, 
there would be presum ption of 
fraud. The quick-count provided 
an elem ent o f stability on the cru­
cial issue of the count. In fact, the 
official results of the election fell 
within the margin of error of the 
quick-count sample. The delega­
tion visited two-thirds of the voting 
sites throughout Guyana during 
the day, filling in detailed ob­
servation forms based on fears 
expressed by the parties of what 
could go wrong on election day.
. . . Conditions at all but 2% of the 
sites visited were found to be satis­
factory.”
For me, the day’s activities be­
gan a bit earlier—at 4:00 a.m. I ob­
served the delivery of ballot boxes, 
witnessed the counting of empty 
ballots, examined the boxes to see 
that they were empty and properly 
locked, and m et representatives 
from the political parties. There 
was no electricity, and the opening 
and closing of the station were 
done by lantern.
By 6:00 a.m. voters, mostly Amer­
indians, began to line up. Allowing 
for individual cases, it averaged 
about 10 minutes for each person 
to identify h im /herself and vote. 
Most would do so successfully and 
place a cross or tick adjacent to 
their party symbol—a cup, palm
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DECLARATION
Under
THE REPRESENTATION OF THE 
PEOPLE ACT 
(Chapter 1:03)
GENERAL ELECTIONS 
DECLARATION OF RESULTS
In accordance with section 99 of the Representa­
tion of the People Act, Chapter 1 ;03, the Elections 
Commission hereby declares that the results of the 
General Elections on 5th October, 1992 pursuant to 
article 60(2) of the Constitution are as follows
(a) The number of votes cast for each list of candi­
dates is as follows:
PEOPLE’S PROGRESSIVE PARTY/CIVIC 
PEOPLES NATIONAL CONGRESS 
WORKING PEOPLE’S ALLIANCE 
THE UNITED FORCE 
DEMOCRATIC LABOUR MOVEMENT 
UNITED REPUBLICAN PARTY 
PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT 
UNION OF GUYANESE INTERNATIONAL 
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN PARTY 
UNITED WORKER’S PARTY 
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT
TOTAL NUMBER OF VALID VOTES
(b) The number of rejected ballot papers is 5,666
162,058
128,286
6,068
3,183
1,557
1,343
298
134
114
77
68
303,186
tree, rising sun, cow, rooster, etc. 
Instructions were provided in Eng­
lish and Macushi, and, in several 
cases, Portuguese, as the Macushi 
pay little attention to international 
borders and generally have family 
in both Guyana and Brazil. The 
polls closed at 6:00 p.m. and the 
counting began. I took my two 
“quick-count” samples and radioed 
them  to Georgetown via a short­
wave transm itter at a Jesuit mission 
station.
N orth American and European 
observers criticized the voting proc­
ess as “inefficient” and “slow. ” I can 
only reply with bem used wonder at 
that conclusion. Many of the voters 
I talked to walked five hours to the 
polling station, stood in line in the 
hot sun for several more, and spent 
five hours after that returning to 
their residences on foot. The time 
standards of the industrialized 
West do not apply in the hinter­
lands of Guyana.
The tabulations at day’s end 
were one with great attention to 
ceremonial detail, allowing each 
poll watcher to examine the 
m arked ballot at the polling station 
count. The elections in Lethem 
proceeded m ore slowly than they 
would have in suburban Grosse 
Point, but they were as clean as a 
sterilized test tube. The townspeo­
ple of Lethem  voted PNC, while 
the Macushi split their ballots be­
tween the WPA and TUF. Ineffi­
cient, perhaps, but proper.
At the same time, propriety was 
being roughly handled back in 
Georgetown. All hell broke loose 
at the Elections Commission office, 
as looters 1,000 strong rampaged 
down Regent and Robb Streets.
In addition, the PPP’s Freedom 
House headquarters came under 
attack. The police and military 
were compelled to cordon off the 
downtown area and stay there on 
fully-armed alert for a week.
In a well-orchestrated effort to 
derail the elections, PNC support­
ers gathered on election-day m orn­
ing to declare that the registration 
lists were inaccurate and that they 
had been disenfranchised. By early
afternoon the situation grew uglier 
still as the commission was attacked 
with stones and bottles, breaking 
all the windows in the building.
The staff retreated upstairs as the 
crowd broke into the com pound 
and trashed the bottom  floors, 
while the US ambassador, cut by 
flying glass, made off for safety.
There were cries of ‘Judas, Judas,” 
“We want Hoyte,” and ‘Japan pay 
Collins.” Dispersed by the disci­
plined forces, the crowd surged 
back to the business district for 
m ore “smash and grab”—the Guy­
anese euphemism for looting—at 
the major departm ent stores, in­
cluding the newly opened K-mart.
Hemisphere •  Winter/Spring 1993
Features: Guyana in Transition
Amateur pundits suggested that 
legitimate frustration, plus the 
fears of PNC supporters that their 
party was going under, was being 
wickedly m anipulated by PNC 
thugs. The looting, however, was 
largely a m atter of personal enrich­
m ent in a situation o f chaos. If 
there was a time during the elec­
tion when the military could have 
stepped in and imposed martial 
law, it was then. Perhaps they 
would have, had not form er US 
president Carter, at great personal 
risk, gone to the Elections Commis­
sion to stand shoulder-to-shoulder 
with the Guyanese staff. He person­
ally called Brigadier Joseph Singh 
of the military and Police Commis­
sioner Laurie Lewis to inform  them  
that they were compelled to pro­
tect an ex-president and in so do­
ing had to protect the Elections 
Commission and the ballot tabulat­
ing equipm ent. It was a close call, 
but the violence that occurred the 
following day was nipped in the 
bud by security forces.
O n Tuesday night Georgetown 
had the somber stillness o f the 
calm before the storm. As I toured 
the city with two journalists, we 
were told to stay away from Sta- 
broek market, where an angry 
crowd was gathering. Two young 
men, an Afro-Guyanese and an 
Indo-Guyanese, rode by on bicycles, 
both sporting huge bread knives in 
their waistbands. They warned us 
to stay off the street as “bad peo­
ple”—who would not accept the 
elections—were gathering and that 
they—mixed pals—were the future 
o f Guyana. Senator Ryan Peralto, 
an observer from the Jamaican 
Labour Party, asked a young Afro 
taxi driver if Afro-Guyanese would 
accept a Jagan government. His an­
swer: “Forget the Afro bullshit, we 
need an elected governm ent.”
Then, in eloquent Guyanese Eng­
lish, he pointed out the virtues of 
the checks and balances of West- 
minster-style parliamentary de­
mocracy. By Wednesday m orning 
Georgetown was quiet, with only 
an occasional lackluster cry of 
“We want Hoyte.” At a cocktail re­
ception that night an African ob­
server on the Commonwealth team 
cornered a lame duck PNC minis­
ter and coyly asked, “You know, 
many people seemed frightened 
of the defense forces. Why do you 
think that is?” The m inister smiled 
weakly and replied that a new con­
sensus was emerging. Any knots 
of people left on the streets at this 
point were only those stranded 
by lack o f transportation.
Perhaps the 
military would 
have intervened, 
had not Jimmy Carter 
gone to the Elections 
Commission in support 
of the Guyanese staff.
The Aftermath
O n Wednesday evening President 
Hoyte spoke on national radio and 
conceded the presidential election. 
He appealed for order and peace 
and promised a legal transfer of 
power. Although not all the votes 
were tabulated, it was clear that the 
uncounted rem ainder would not 
compensate for Jagan’s lead. The 
presidential contest, however, was 
only half the battle. It would have 
to wait until all the votes were 
counted before the distribution 
of parliamentary seats could be an­
nounced. For president, the candi­
date with the majority of votes wins 
the office. That winner was clear 
early on. The 65 seats in parlia­
m ent are another matter, thanks to 
Guyana’s tricky system of propor­
tional representation at the na­
tional and regional levels.
O f the 65 members of the Na­
tional Assembly, 55 are elected in 
accordance with the proportions 
each party receives in the presiden­
tial election. Jagan’s 52% netted
the PPP/Civic 28 seats; Hoyte’s 
44% netted the PNC 23 seats. The 
WPA with 2% captured one seat 
and the TUF’s 1% allowed them  to 
squeak in with one. Ten o f the as­
sembly seats are elected by the 10 
Regional Democratic Councils; 
one seat for each of the 10 districts, 
with the council mem bership be­
ing voted on at the same time as 
the president. Finally, two seats are 
elected by a national meeting of 
the National Council of Local 
Democratic Councils. The final 
totals were PPP/Civic 35, PNC 27, 
WPA 2, and TUF 1. Although not 
formally in coalition, the PPP/
Civic, WPA, and TUF are collabo­
rating. PPP/Civic also worked deals 
with WPA region eight and TUF in 
region nine to bolster the three par­
ties’ acquisition of regional seats 
and thereby enlarge their repre­
sentation in parliament.
There will be rumblings from 
such PNC types as form er prime 
minister Hamilton Greene and 
form er director o f propaganda 
and mobilization Robert Corbin 
issuing threats and bombast from 
time to time. Hoyte, however, will 
probably endeavor to secure his 
place in Guyanese history by be­
coming the grandfatherly and re­
sponsible leader of the PNC. It 
seems likely that he will pursue 
rebuilding the party in an equally 
responsible fashion. After all, the 
PNC did not lose by that much. 
Hoyte can also salve the wound 
of loss by heeding the example of 
two CARICOM political figures: 
Jam aica’s Edward Seaga and Trini­
dad and Tobago’s Patrick Manning. 
Both lost elections and offered 
their assistance in the transition 
of power. Both survived the experi­
ence to return  to power, Manning 
having achieved the goal in a simi­
larly multiethnic state.
The newly self-confident Guy­
anese people do not want to see a 
return  to the dark and destructive 
days of Burnhamism. The outside 
world is watching and my guess is 
that the democratic process is ir­
reversible in Guyana. It’s about 
time. ■
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Cuban Politics: The Revolution­
ary Experiment 
by Rhoda Rabkin. Praeger Publishers,
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eatro, puro teatro," the 
late Cuban songstress 
H j  La Lupe (a.k.a. La Yiyiyi)Jjj belted in one of her signa-
H j  ture songs. Although she 
M i was expressing the theatri­
cality of duplicitous love, as she 
pranced on the stage, tearing off 
h er clothes, slapping her pianist, 
and screaming at the audience, her 
lyrics could ju st as well have re­
ferred to the arena of politics. Poli­
tics is theater, if not show business. 
Like drama, politics has a text and 
a subtext, a stage and a backstage.
As in the plays of Bertolt Brecht, 
the actors and the audience in­
teract. And as when we en ter a 
playhouse, politics requires us to 
believe in the possibility o f a dif­
ferent world. The tension between 
the governed and the governing is 
the dramatic heart of politics. The 
plot unfolds as the conflicts be­
tween the two emerge.
Like La Lupe, Cuban politics 
have always been theatrical; in fact,
Damian Fernandez is associate pro­
fessor of international relations and 
director of the Graduate Program in 
International Studies at Florida Inter­
national University. He is the editor of 
Cuban Studies since the Revolu­
tion (University Press of Florida, 1992).
they reached operatic dimensions 
after Fidel Castro’s revolutionary 
ascent to power in 1959. The genre 
of the perform ance differs accord­
ing to the viewer and the reviewer. 
For some it is epic, for others tragic 
or comic, and for yet others it is 
theater of the absurd. Scholars and 
journalists have differed in their re­
views of the Cuban production.
Cuban politics have 
always been theatrical; 
in fact, they reached 
operatic dimensions 
after Fidel Castro’s 
revolutionary ascent 
to power in 1959.
The genre of the 
| performance differs 
according to the 
viewer and the 
reviewer.
The difference between how 
journalists and scholars approach a 
topic is, at its most basic level, one 
of language. It is also, however, 
one of time and space: journalists 
capture a scene, while scholars at­
tem pt to cover the entire three-act 
play. A nother difference is that of 
audience. A journalist’s words are 
read by many; a scholar’s, typically, 
by few. Journalists are usually at 
their best when they focus on di­
mensions of life that scholars
seldom address. Journalists can 
provide entertainm ent and enlight­
enm ent at the same time; scholars 
are socialized to be serious, as if 
seriousness were a virtue. Yet, 
given their distinctly different ap­
proaches, the work of journalists 
and scholars can be com plem en­
tary. Castro ’5 Final Hour, by Andres 
O ppenheim er of the Miami Herald, 
and Cuban Politics, by Rhoda Rab­
kin of Cornell University, are com­
plementary indeed.
O ppenheim er’s book can be 
summarized in three words: sex, 
drugs, and rock-and-roll. To be 
sure, these topics are neglected in 
political science scholarship, out of 
either prejudice against the m un­
dane, puritanism, or lack of train­
ing on how to incorporate them. 
O ppenheim er also deals with the 
role of chance, relajo (horsing 
around), rumors, and the sweat of 
everyday life, with which scholars 
are ill at ease.
O ppenheim er’s Castro’s Final 
Hour starts in the middle of the ac­
tion, with the execution o f General 
Arnaldo Ochoa, one of Cuba’s 
most decorated officers, on July 13,
1989. In sharp contrast, the open­
ing scene of Rabkin’s Cuban Politics 
sets the stage by introducing the 
them e of objectivity and paradigms 
in the social sciences: “In the social 
sciences, objectivity does not mean 
the complete absence o f values and 
preconceptions. That is impossible. 
Moreover, it is also undesirable. 
W ithout some guiding sense of 
putative relationships am ong vari­
ables, the social scientist could only 
record and transmit chaos” (p. 1). 
Journalists record and transmit 
chaos, albeit in edited fashion. 
Scholars crave order and try to 
construct it, even when the order 
of things is disorder.
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Castro’s Final Hour promises 
thrills and chills, and it delivers.
It is almost a ready-made script for 
a first-rate television miniseries. Al­
though the book reads like fiction, 
it isn’t. In politics, as in Pirandello, 
the margins between the real and 
the surreal merge, and O ppen­
heim er has captured that gray area 
better than any other journalist or 
scholar before him. To boot, the 
book grabs the reader like few, if 
any, others on the subject do.
The power of Castro’s Final Hour 
is no t only of style but of substance 
as well. This book is investigative 
reporting at its best. (Eat your 
hearts out, Geraldo, Oprah, and 
Jane!) The author goes behind the 
scene, backstage, to look at the pro­
tagonists sans costumes or make­
up. What O ppenheim er discovers 
and uncovers is a world that rivals 
Um berto Eco’s.
As in the works of Brecht, lan­
guage is one of the central themes 
of O ppenheim er’s book. On No­
vember 2, 1991, when Castro ad­
dressed the Prim er Congreso de 
Pioneros, he spent more than two 
hours lecturing on Che Guevara’s 
dialectics to an audience of six- 
year-olds (pp. 403-7). Alina Fer­
nandez, Castro’s daughter by Nati 
Revuelta, confesses she had to re­
sort to the dictionary to find a 
word that described her father: 
“W hen people tell me he is a dicta­
tor, I tell them  that is no t the right 
word . . . strictly speaking, Fidel is 
a tyrant. I have looked up the two 
words in the dictionary” (p. 282). 
Yet Alina is convinced that the 
majority of Cubans still support 
the “Revolution,” another mis­
nom er for the country’s current 
political situation. Reality, and 
the interpretation of it, is a messy 
business.
Language is as vital in politics 
as it is in drama. In the streets of 
Cuba a new language is being cre­
ated daily, challenging the official 
discourse of the state through graf­
fiti, slang, double talk, jokes, and 
music. In Cuban Politics, Rabkin 
transcribes examples of the em erg­
ing alternative vocabulary that cap­
tures the new reality (e.g., mayimbe, 
pincho—buddies in high places who 
act as intermediaries to get things 
done). Likewise, in Castro’s Final 
Hour, O ppenheim er records the 
lyrics of a hit song, rife with rhyth­
mic double-entendre (p. 265):
In the streets of Cuba 
a new language is 
being created daily, 
challenging the official 
discourse of the state 
through graffiti, slang, 
double talk, jokes, and 
music.
“'Guillermo Tell/tu hijo crecio/quiere 
tirar la flecha/Le toca a el/probar su 
valor/usando tu ballesta” (“ William 
Tell/your son has grown up/he wants 
to shoot the arrow/It’s his turn/to prove 
his valor/using your crossbow”) .
Words do not tell the whole 
story, though. When they become 
too dangerous to be spoken, the 
characters resort to gestures, signs, 
body language, and silence. As 
characters speak and act their parts, 
conflicts arise. In O ppenheim er’s 
portrayal of Cuba, the characters,
even when they appear in the lime­
light, misread their lines. Listen, 
for instance, to culture minister 
Armando H art’s m onologue, in 
reply to O ppenheim er’s com m ent 
that H art is considered to be one 
of the most open-m inded members 
of Castro’s inner circle: “They told 
you that? Who told you that? That 
is crazy! I d o n ’t consider myself tol­
erant at all! . . . No! No! No! . . . 
D on’t you dare accuse me of being 
tolerant, liberal or anything like 
that .  . .” (p. 312).
O ppenheim er’s cast is as diverse 
as a Cecil B. De Mille production. 
The Cuba he presents is peopled 
by babalaos, or santeria priests, 
and their oracles (the chorus in a 
Greek tragedy?); by Che Guevara’s 
grandson, Canek, who dreams not 
of the jungles of Bolivia but of be­
coming a rock star (a Broadway 
musical?); by Nitza Villapol, the 
grandam e o f Cuban cuisine who 
invents 1,001 ways to eat potatoes 
and yells at the author as he leaves 
her apartm ent, “We are standing 
up against US aggression. We are 
proud of that!” (a candidate for 
production by the Instituto del 
Cine y Arte Cubano?); by m en and 
women who find ingenious ways to 
resolver, or make do (a version of 
the picaresque?); by General 
O choa’s widow (a “60 M inutes” 
segm ent?); by the Cuban mistress 
of an international drug trafficker 
who plays the role of fifth business 
(a forthcoming Roxanne Pulitzer 
novel?); by Gabriel Garcia Marquez 
(with the author seeming to be­
come one of his characters in The 
Autumn of the Patriarch}); by human- 
rights activists (a morality play?); 
and by spies (a esperpento?). All in 
all, O ppenheim er presents a Cu­
ban carnival, masks included. The 
result is a view of Cuba that is far
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m ore textured, vibrant, and plural 
than what Cuban officials and the 
theory of totalitarianism would 
have us believe.
Rabkin and O ppenheim er agree 
that Castro has been the leading 
m an of Cuban politics since 1959. 
Both of them  question whether the 
show can go on without his com­
m anding performance. Yet, if the 
m en and women in the streets 
are the supporting cast of O ppen­
heim er’s book, the cast in Rabkin’s 
Cuban Politics features no t only Cas­
tro but also the formal institutions 
of political power (the Partido 
Comunista de Cuba and the mass 
organizations). Making cameo 
appearances are Marx, Lenin, de 
Tocqueville, Harvard political scien­
tist Jorge Dominguez, and political 
writer Carlos Alberto M ontaner, 
am ong other thinkers whose works 
the author uses to help us under­
stand Cuban politics since 1959.
Like O ppenheim er, Rabkin goes 
behind the stage to analyze the 
ideas, institutions, and actions that 
have shaped Cuban politics since
the advent of the revolution. Un­
like o ther scholars who have writ­
ten texts on Cuba, Rabkin pays 
attention no t only to the formal ex­
pressions of political power, but to 
the informal, the subjective, the elu­
sive, and the invisible as well (from 
the role of Fidel Castro and the ad­
miration, “bordering on m adness,” 
o f his followers, to the “shrewdness 
and good luck” that tend to desert 
him on economic issues). She pep­
pers her discussions of broader is­
sues with anecdotes, rendering 
palatable an otherwise bland dis­
cussion.
Rabkin is sophisticated in her 
analysis, standing am ong two or 
three o ther Cubanists in this re­
spect. She does not see the revolu­
tion as inevitable. She does not 
exaggerate the power of the US 
over Cuba (p. 145). She presents 
contending perspectives (although 
the work has a unique voice: Rab­
kin is no wimp). These are uncom ­
mon finds in the literature on the 
politics of the island, and deserve 
applause.
Cuban Politics focuses on elites. 
From Rabkin’s perspective, elites 
make politics. Throughout history, 
political change, according to her, 
tends to come from above. None­
theless, Rabkin, like Oppenheim er, 
does not envision a deux ex machina 
that will save the day for Cuban 
socialism in the 1990s. Both au­
thors argue that the die has been 
cast, although neither is sure how 
the power play will unfold.
In spite of the differences 
between the two books, striking 
similarities emerge due to the con­
tinuity of Cuban politics over time. 
Corruption was as m uch a part of 
the set before Castro as it has been 
during his regime, and probably 
will be after his departure. During 
Fulgencio Batista’s years in power, 
“the glittering corruption o f the 
capital city was an affront to the 
middle-class morals and national 
pride . . .” (p. 24), Rabkin writes, 
pointing the finger at prostitution, 
brothels, and casinos. O ppen­
heim er focuses on the “jineteros 
and jineteras” (hustlers) that hang 
around hotels looking to trade sex 
for dollars or consum er goods, a 
public affront to the revolutionary 
(yet equally “bourgeois”) values of 
the state.
Can the experim ental produc­
tion of Marxism-Leninism con­
tinue to be produced on the Cuban 
stage? What the scholar and the 
journalist seem to say is that the of­
ficial perform ance is attracting less 
and less of an audience, because 
fewer and fewer Cubans find the 
protagonists believable. Theater 
and politics, at this point, lose their 
power to convince; in short, they 
lose their magic. The government 
m ight continue performing, but 
it will be less able to govern as Cu­
bans realize that the entire arrange­
m ent is “teatro, puro teatro."
As to how and when the curtain 
will come down in this act, both 
Rabkin and O ppenheim er leave 
us in suspense. In this regard, the 
scholar does not fare any better 
than the journalist, because reality 
writes itself as it unfolds, outwitting 
us all. ■
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Guyana
by Marian Goslinga
he Guyanese National Bibliography, issued quarterly by the National Library (Georgetown, Guyana) 
since 1974, provides a comprehensive record of publishing in the country. In addition, bibliographies 
such as Frances Cham bers’s Guyana (Clio Press, 1989) cite works published abroad that deal with the 
country. O ther lists have been printed since that time, usually appended to current publications. The 
following citations date from 1990 and provide the most recent information available on various aspects 
of Guyana.
Aroaima Bauxite Hits Output Tar­
get: Reynold Venture Seen at Full 
in ’92. Bob Regan. American Metal 
Market, v. 99, no. 254 (December 6, 
1991), p. 2-4. [About the Aroaima 
Bauxite Company in Guyana.]
Bauxite Processing in Jamaica and 
Guyana: An Extension to Aluminum 
Smelting. James P. McCoy. World 
Development, v. 20, no. 5 (May 1992), 
p. 751-66. [Building on previous re­
search, this study uses input-output 
analysis to estimate the national 
income and foreign exchange im­
pacts of aluminum smelting.]
Bringing Racism into the Open: 
Guyanese Action for Reform and 
Democracy. William Steif. The
Progressive, v. 54. no. 10 (October
1990), p. 12-14.
The Cambio-System o f an Inde­
pendent Exchange-Rate Float:
The Case o f Guyana. C. Thomas,
R. Rampersaud. Social and Economic 
Studies, v. 40, no. 4 (December
1991), p. 115-46. [Examines the 
International Monetary Fund’s 
“cambio system” or independent 
exchange rate float in effect in 
Guyana since March 1990.]
Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri­
can and Caribbean librarian at Florida 
International University.
Cambior Eyes Gold in Guyana.
C hristopher Munford. American 
Metal Market, v. 98, no. 252 (Decem­
ber 31, 1990), p. 2-4.
Carib Ethnic Soldiering in Vene­
zuela, the Guianas, and the An­
tilles. Neil W hitehead. Ethnohistory, 
v. 37, no. 4 (1990), p. 557-85.
Clive Thomas on the McIntyre Re­
port. Clive Yolande Thomas. George­
town: Working People’s Alliance, 
1990. 8 p. [Contemporary eco­
nomic conditions and policy in 
Guyana.]
Community Involvement in Reha­
bilitation Programs for Disabled 
Children: A Guyanese Experience.
B. O ’Toole. Community Development 
Journal, v. 26, no. 5 (1991), p. 202-9.
Conquering the Useless: El 
Dorado’s Imaginary Geographies.
C. Ales, M. Pouyllau. Homme, v. 52, 
nos. 2-4 (April-December 1992),
p. 271-508. [Analyzes the search for 
El Dorado, the legendary “land of 
gold,” which early map-makers indi­
cated between the Andes and the 
Guianas.]
East Indians and Anthropologists:
A Critical Review. Steven Vertovec. 
Social and Economic Studies, v. 40, 
no. 1 (1991), p. 155-69. [Study of 
ethnicity, culture, and community 
developm ent in Guyana and Trini­
dad.]
An Econometric Model o f the Guy­
anese Economy, 1957-1976. Leslie 
Jarvis. Lanham, Md.: University 
Press of America, 1990. 76 p.
Ethnic Conflict and Development: 
The Case o f Guyana. Ralph R. 
Premdas. Geneva: UN Research 
Institute for Social Development,
1992. 27 p. [Analyzes the causes 
and consequences of tension be­
tween Indians and blacks in Guy­
ana.]
Ethnic Conflict and Political Con­
trol: The Guyana Case. Perry Mars.
Social and Economic Studies, v. 39, 
no. 3 (September 1990), p. 65-94.
Fantasy Play, Language and Cogni­
tive Ability o f Four-Year-Old Chil­
dren in Guyana, South America.
L. C. Taharally. Child Study Journal, 
v. 21, no. 1 (1991), p. 37-56.
Gold Rush Arrives in Guiana 
Shield: Bypassed by Major Pro­
ducers for Over a Century, Guyana 
and Venezuela Offer Opportuni­
ties. Fred Barnard. Engineering and 
Miningjoumal, v. 191, no. 8 (August 
1990), p. 57-62. [Includes legal and 
tax environments for m ining in 
both countries.]
The Guiana Connection. John  P.
Sisk. The Hudson Review, v. 43, no. 1 
(Spring 1990), p. 85-99. [About Sir 
Walter Raleigh and the discovery 
of Guyana.]
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Guyana at the Crossroads. Dennis 
Watson, Christine Craig, eds. New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Pub­
lishers, 1992. 95 p. [Proceedings of 
a seminar held in November 1991 
in Coral Gables, Florida, and spon­
sored by the Caribbean Resources 
Development Foundation in asso­
ciation with the North-South Cen­
ter of the University of Miami and 
Florida International University.]
Guyana Dreaming: The Art of 
Aubrey Williams. Anne Walmsley, 
comp. Sydney: Dangaroo Press,
1990. 112 p. [Essay on the Guy­
anese painter.]
Guyana Food Performance in a 
Caribbean Context: Lessons for 
Food Security Policy. J. Ford. Food 
Policy, v. 17, no. 5 (October 1992), 
p. 326-36. [Discusses Guyana’s agri­
cultural development policy in the 
postindependence period.]
Guyana Means Business. Larry 
Luxner. Americas, v. 43, no. 1 
(January-February 1991), p. 36-42. 
[Examines recent economic devel­
opm ents with emphasis on the rum  
industry.]
The Guyana Mosaic. Robert J. Fer­
nandes. Georgetown: Guyana Stores,
1990. 56 p. [Pictorial work on con­
temporary Guyana.]
Guyana Seeking a New Future. Ran­
dolph Mye. Business America, v. I l l ,  
no. 2 (January 29, 1990), p. 8.
Guyana’s Test at High Tide: Prob­
lem o f Water Inundation. Omar 
Sattaur. New Scientist, v. 125, no.
1710 (March 31, 1990), p. 46-50.
Guyana: Where Libraries Are an 
Endangered Species. Rosa Jordan.
Library Journal, v. 115, no. 7 (April 
15, 1990), p. 58-60.
Guyanese Paper Takes Independ­
ent Course: Despite Dangers, 
Obstacles, “Stabroek News” Is 
Growing. William Steif. Editor &  
Publisher, v. 123. no. 33 (August 18, 
1990), p. 26-28.
Hallelujah and the Library in the 
Savannahs: Personal Narrative of 
Guyana. Jo  Pacsoo. Contemporary 
Review, v. 256, no. 1489 (February 
1990), p. 98-101. [Narrative of a 
volunteer worker am ong Guyana’s 
Macusi Indians.]
A Handful o f Dust: Return to 
Guiana. V. S. Naipaul. The New York 
Review of Books, v. 38, no. 7 (April 
11, 1991), p. 15-21. [Includes biog­
raphies of Cheddi Jagan and Forbes 
Burnham.]
Jonestown: Two Faces o f Suicide; 
a Durkheimian Analysis. Albert
Black, Jr. Suicide &  Life-Threatening 
Behavior, v. 20, no. 4 (Winter 1990), 
p. 285-306.
A Macroeconomic Model o f the 
Guyanese Economy. G. Ganga. 
Social and Economic Studies, v. 39, 
no. 3 (1990), p. 1-38.
Macroeconomic Modeling and 
Policy Analysis for Less Developed 
Countries. Mohammed F. Khayum. 
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1991. 203 p. [Includes special sec­
tion on Guyana.]
The Military and the Politics of 
Change in Guyana. Ivelaw L. Grif-
fith .Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs, v. 33, no. 2 
(Summer 1991), p. 141-73. [Dis- 
| cusses developments since inde­
pendence, with emphasis on the 
1980s.]
Morphosyntactic Acculturation 
at the Rural/Urban Interface in 
Guyana. Walter F. Edwards. Ameri­
can Speech, v. 65, no. 2 (Summer
1990), p. 99-114. [Compares the 
incidence of certain linguistic char­
acteristics in the speech of George­
town natives and recent rural 
arrivals.]
Native Political Networks in West­
ern Guiana and Changes during 
the 17th-Century and 18th-Century.
Simone Dreyfus. Homme, v. 32, nos. 
2-4 (April-December 1992), p. 75- 
98. [Discusses the virtual destruc­
tion of native political networks, 
used since colonial times, in trade 
and slave-hunting.]
The New International Political 
Economy o f Guyana. Frank Long. 
The Round Table (January 1991), 
p. 73-80. [Analyzes the transition 
from state ownership and control 
to private enterprise during the 
1970s and 1980s.]
The Political Economy o f Educa­
tion in Guyana: Implications for 
Human Rights. Noel K. Samaroo. 
The Journal of Negro Education, v. 60, 
no. 4 (Fall 1991), p. 512-23. [Exam­
ines hum an rights violations in 
education and identifies the socio­
economic factors responsible for 
the current situation.]
Politics, Race, and Youth in 
Guyana. Madan M. Copal. San 
Francisco, Calif.: Mellen Research 
University Press, 1992. 289 p. [Ex­
amines and interprets the political 
attitudes of working-class East In­
dian adolescents within an ethnic 
framework.]
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Predictability o f Anomalous River 
Discharge in Guyana. Stefan Has- 
tenrath. Nature, v. 345, no. 6270 
(May 3, 1990), p. 53-55. [Discusses 
the Essequibo river system.]
Privatisation and Divestment. Clive 
Yolande Thomas. Georgetown: Work­
ing People’s Alliance, 1990. 8 p.
A Quarter Century o f Failure.
Clinton Collymore. Georgetown: 
People’s Progressive Party, 1990.
36 p. [Discusses the regime of the 
People’s National Congress, 1964- 
89.]
The Race to Save Guyana’s Rain­
forests. Fred Pearce. New Scientist, 
v. 133, no. 1813 (March 21, 1992), 
p. 15-16.
A Review and Analysis o f Attempts 
in the West Indies to Relate Educa­
tion to the Perceived Needs o f the 
Labour Market: With Special Refer­
ence to Guyana. M. Kazim Bacchus. 
Education with Production, v. 7, no. 2 
(April 1991), p. 53-68. [Reviews 
Guyana’s efforts to relate its edu­
cational programs m ore directly to 
the work environment.]
Sacking Guyana: Rainforests under 
Siege. Marcus Colchester. Multina­
tional Monitor, v. 12 (Summer 1991), 
p. 8-14. [Analyzes the environ­
mental consequences of increased 
logging and deforestation by multi­
national corporations.]
Stains on My Name, War in My 
Veins: Guyana and the Politics of 
Cultural Struggle. BracketteF. Wil­
liams. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univer­
sity Press, 1991. 322 p.
State Organized Terror: The Case 
of Violent Internal Repression.
P. Timothy Bushnell. Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1991. 312 p. [In­
cludes a chapter on the People’s 
Temple sect’s collective suicide in 
1978 in Jonestown, Guyana.]
Strategy and Security in the Carib­
bean. Ivelaw L. Griffith, ed. New 
York: Praeger, 1991. 206 p. [In­
cludes section on Guyana’s defense 
policy.]
Tense and Aspect in Guyanese 
Creole with Reference to Jamaican 
and Carriacouan. Kean Gibson. In­
ternational Journal of American Lin­
guistics, v. 58, no. 1 (January 1992), 
p. 49-95.
Third-World Decollectivization: 
Guyana, Nicaragua, and Vietnam.
Frederic L. Pryor. Problems of Com­
munism, v. 40, no. 3 (May-June 
1991), p. 97-108.
Tracing Our Path in a Changing 
World. Cheddi Jagan. Georgetown: 
People’s Progressive Party, 1990.
32 p. [About politics in contem po­
rary Guyana.]
Transition to Democracy in the 
Caribbean: Haiti, Guyana, and Suri­
nam. Hearing before the Subcom­
mittee on Western Hemisphere 
Affairs of the Committee on For­
eign Affairs, House of Representa­
tives, 102d Congress, 1st session, 
June 26, 1991. Washington, DC, 
1991. 110 p.
The Truth about Jonestown, 13 
Years Later: Why We Should Still 
Be Afraid. Keith Harrary. Psychology 
Today, v. 25, no. 2 (March-April 
1992), p. 62-70.
Video Policy in Guyana: Processes 
of National and International Com­
munication. M. Kent Sidel. Journal­
ism Quarterly, v. 67, no. 3 (Autumn 
1990), p. 531-36.
Debt, Environm ent, Developm ent, Hum an Rights, Technology, 
A gricu ltu re  and E co n o m ics . . .
Third World Quarterly has established a unique reputation over the 
past decade as the leading po licy  journa l on contem porary Third 
W orld affairs.
Third World Quarterly lends an unm atched critica l perspective on 
global problem s and provides an analysis o f im po rtan t issues 
concern ing the Asia/P acific  region, Latin Am erica and the 
Caribbean, A frica and the M iddle East.
Third World Quarterly is published in January, April, Ju ly  and 
October. Each issue runs to  approxim ate ly 300 pages, over 80 o f 
w hich are devoted to  literature and book reviews -  both fic tion  
and non-fic tion .
Past contributors have included:
M orris J. Blachman 
Kenneth Sharpe 
Louis Rene Beres 
Peter Flynn 
Oliver Tambo 
Walden Bello 
James Painter 
Laurence Harris 
Carolina G 
Hernandez 
Naseer Aruri 
Chibli Mallat 
Nader Entessar
Price $34.00/223 pa.
Subscription: Send your order to:
Circulation Manager, Third World Quarterly, Rex House, 
1st Floor, 4-12 Lower Regent Street, London SW1Y4PE
Yasser Arafat 
Farouq Kaddoumi 
James Petras 
Mahathir Mohamad 
Guy Martin 
James Dinkerley 
Raul Alfonsin 
Barnett R Rubin 
Claudia W right 
Robert C Johansen
Alan Garcia Perez
Rudiger Dornbusch 
Ibrahim F I Shihata 
Ali A Mazrui 
Haleh Afshar 
Riodan Roett 
Feroz Ahmad 
Arturo Valenzuela 
George Joffe 
Yezid Sayigh 
Lionel Cliffe 
Shridath Ramphal 
Sheldon W Simon
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